> most of them already carry all that’s necessary (and more) to perform
surveillance from inside the endpoint.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Quite the opposite, actually.
It's already been explained why endpoint-based measures are impractical.
If they were practical, they'd already be in widespread use, and this
wouldn't be an issue in the first place. When there is a pool of data waiting for the operator to (figuratively speaking) push a button on a switch and start intercepting the traffic in plaintext – there’s no need to go through the extra inconvenience of using endpoints for that. No surprise. I keep telling that this pool is drying up. It’s “go to endpoint for the plaintext” or “sorry, no plaintext at all” (or “stay with the old stuff – using old-rotten methods goes hand-in-hand with the bit-rot of the older protocols”).
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