On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 6:02 AM, Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx> wrote:

> You could avoid changing how the DH works altogether by simply exporting
> the DH private key, encrypted with a key shared with the monitoring device,
> in a server extension.  (Not in EncryptedExtensions, obviously.)  This
> would also have the benefit of explicitly signaling when such monitoring is
> in use.  The only real challenge here is that the client would have to
> offer the extension in order for the server to be able to send it, which I
> expect things like browsers would be unlikely to do.  However, given that
> the target of this draft seems to be intra-data-center TLS, perhaps this is
> a workable requirement?
>

I very much like the property that by using an extension, the client must
consent to being MitMed.

But in this case, why not just keywrap the session master secret with a
preshared KEK as opposed to exfiltrating the DH private key?

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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