> On May 15, 2017, at 3:38 PM, Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>
>>> I don't see an explanation of why it is out-of-scope. The reference
>>> is just to RFC5280, which seems odd. I would expect the reference to
>>> be to something that explains why it is out-of-scope.
>
> I think the the separation of certificate path validation from the TLS
> protocol is correct, but perhaps this can be explained differently.
> Perhaps the approach should be that TLS depends upon certificate path
> validation as described in RFC 5280.
That's not always true. With DANE-EE(3) TLSA records there is no
path validation. You just validate the EE certificate directly.
With DANE-EE(2), there's an RFC5280 chain, but it terminates on
a trust-anchor provided by the peer as part of its chain, with
a hash in DNS.
With unauthenticated opportunistic TLS, the peer's chain is ignored
entirely.
How and whether the peer's certificate message is used is properly
outside TLS.
--
Viktor.
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