On Tue, May 02, 2017 at 01:33:37PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On May 2, 2017, at 10:44 AM, Colm MacCárthaigh <c...@allcosts.net> wrote:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1001
> > 
> > I'll summarize the summary: Naturally the focus was on forward
> > secrecy and replay. On forward secrecy the main finding was that
> > it's not necessary to trade off Forward Secrecy and 0-RTT. A
> > single-use session cache can provide it, and with the modification
> > that ekr has created in https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/998
> > , such a cache works for both pre-auth and post-auth tickets, and it
> > allows clients to build up pools of meaningfully distinct tickets.

With existing APIs, dealing with "pools of meaningfully distinct
tickets" seems meaningfully non-trivial.

> > There's also an observation there that it should really be that
> > clients "MUST" use tickets only once. Any re-use likely discloses
> > the obfuscated ticket age, which is intended to be secret. Right now
> > it's a "SHOULD".

Why should ticket age disclosure be a problem?  How does ticket one-time
use not do the same?

> Well, just a few days ago there was a discussion of ticket re-use, and
> I was re-assured that ticket re-use was likely to going to work just
> fine...

I sure hope so!!

Nico
-- 

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