Unfortunately, Outlook seems to be incapable of properly quoting a message for
inline replies, so I will have to top-post with the relevant bits.
I’ll try to put together some text on side-channel resistance along with my
pull request for editorial changes.
With respect to psk_key_exchange_modes, PreSharedKey and KeyShare are enough
for the existing modes, but my understanding was that the plan with splitting
the modes out this way was to allow adding new modes in later documents,
including PSK for server authentication. Can we guarantee that for all future
modes we might add, there will be some other extension that indicates what was
picked? (I guess we can probably arrange for that to happen with how we
specify the new modes, so it’s not actually a big deal, but might or might not
make things more awkward in the future.)
The problematic text about ciphertext length/expansion for tag and other things
was in the description of the TLSCiphertext ‘length’ field, which says:
length The length (in bytes) of the following
TLSCiphertext.fragment, which is the sum of the lengths of the
content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type. The
length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256. An endpoint that receives a
record that exceeds this length MUST terminate the connection with
a "record_overflow" alert.
(There is no TLSCiphertext.fragment field.) Assuming it’s talking about the
length of the “opaque encrypted_record[length]” member (which seems obvious), I
do not see how the length is the sum of the length of the (plaintext) content
and padding and content-type octet, since the AEAD-encryption is supposed to
add some amount of expansion. Probably the answer is to just remove any
discussion about what the length represents, since it is not really helping
anything; the specification for the AEAD in use will specify the ciphertext
length.
On 11/14/16, 10:44, "Eric Rescorla" <e...@rtfm.com> wrote:
On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 8:54 AM, Kaduk, Ben
<bka...@akamai.com> wrote:
I have reviewed this document and have a few minor comments. I also have
many editorial notes that can be addressed out of band.
In the abstract and introduction, we have text about the properties that
TLS is expected to provide, like confidentiality, authentication, etc. Do we
want to say anything about avoiding side channels that might leak information
about the data being exchanged?
I know that we are not 100% confident at what exactly we currently achieve
in this area, but since we have mechanisms that attempt to achieve it, maybe it
is worth mentioning. (In a similar vein, as davidben reminded me recently, an
attacker “who has complete
control of the network”, as is our stated adversary, can do things like
trickle packets in one by one and try to see, e.g., where the end of early data
is and query handshake state. So some things may not be avoidable.)
I'd be interested in seeing a PR in this area.
In section 4.2.5.1 we talk about how for FFDH peers SHOULD validate each
other’s public key Y by ensuring that 1 < Y < p-1, which is supposed to ensure
that the peer is well-behaved and isn’t forcing the local system into a small
subgroup. Somehow I thought
that additional checks were needed to avoid being forced into a small
subgroup, but I guess that depends on what group it’s in, and I didn’t pull up
the RFC 7919 reference when I was reading this document.
These are the recommendations in 7919, I believe
In section 4.2.7, we note that the server MUST NOT send the
“psk_key_exchange_modes” extension, with the implication that the client must
observer the types of handshake messages that are subsequently received in
order to determine what the server selected.
I think that we had talked about this already some time ago, but just
wanted to confirm that we are okay with increasing the size of the client state
machine in this manner.
It's not subsequent messages. You determine it from the PreSharedKey and
KeyShare extensions.
In section 4.5.1 we note that when client auth is not used, servers MAY
compute the remainder of the client-sent messages for the transcript so as to
issue a NewSessionTicket immediately after the server Finished. Do we want to
say anything about why a server
might wish to do so?
I think I would rather not.
The coverage of record payload protection (around section 5.2) seems to not
always make careful distinction between TLSPlaintext, TLSCiphertext,
TLSInnerPlaintext, and the fields therein. In some sense this is editorial,
but there were a lot of places that
I flagged, so I wanted to call it out to the broader audience and get more
eyes on it. I also didn’t find a description of where the length of the AEAD
authentication tag gets included into a length field for the ciphertext.
I'm not following this point. The way to think about this is that the
ciphertext is a specific size. That may be encryption + auth tag or not (it's
possible to design an AEAD algorithm that doesn't have a separate auth tag).
-Ekr
At the end of section 6.1 we have this little note that “it is assumed that
closing a connection reliably delivers pending data before destroying the
transport”, which, if I remember correctly previous discussion on this list, is
not actually true for linux.
It is perhaps problematic to have an assumption that we know is not going
to be held for a large proportion of implementations.
-Ben
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