> Since then, I've seen exactly ZERO rationale why the cleartext contenttype,
> which has existed through SSLv3->TLSv1.2 would be a problem.
Because it's kind of implied in the charter, about making as much private as
possible.
> years), because it is actively being used to signal state of the communication
> channel to the application and to *NOT* break application architecture that
> relies on (new) application data remaining visible on network sockets as
> "network readable" events.
One app's data is another adversary's oracle. Or is it that "signals have no
morals"?
/r$
--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richs...@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
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