Good. I will try to clarify. PRs welcome On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 2:37 PM, Nick Harper <nhar...@google.com> wrote:
> That's my assumption as well. > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 2:07 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: > >> I was assuming that there were two exporters: >> >> Export() --> the same API as in 1.2 and computed as described here >> Export0RTT -> A new API that computes the early_exporter. >> >> >> -Ekr >> >> On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Nick Harper <nhar...@google.com> wrote: >> >>> Does the wording of this PR mean that the value from the exporter >>> changes depending on whether it's run before or after exporter_secret can >>> be computed? I think it would be better to keep an RFC 5705-style exporter >>> that remains constant for the connection. The 0-RTT exporter from an API >>> perspective can be a separate thing that a caller has to explicitly choose >>> to use. >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 8:10 AM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Please see the following PR: >>>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/673 >>>> >>>> This includes various changes to make exporters/resumption work better. >>>> >>>> Basically: >>>> 1. Add a 0-RTT exporter and change the transcript for the regular >>>> exporter so it >>>> only includes the transcript up to ServerFinished. This gives it >>>> parity with the >>>> rest of the traffic keys. If we need an exporter with the full >>>> transcript we can >>>> always add it later >>>> >>>> 2. Point out that you can predict ClientFinished for NST when not doing >>>> Client auth. This lets you issue tickets on the server's first >>>> flight, while still >>>> ensuring that if you do client auth you still bind resumption to >>>> the client's >>>> full transcript. >>>> >>>> These are pretty straightforward changes, so absent objections I'll >>>> merge >>>> them early next week. >>>> >>>> -Ekr >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> TLS mailing list >>>> TLS@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>>> >>>> >>> >> >
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