I occasionally see people ask why we're calling it TLS 1.3 when so much has 
changed, and I used to simply think that it was too bikesheddy to bother 
changing at this point. However, now that we've redone negotiation, we have new 
TLS 1.3+ only cipher suites. The old are not compatible with the new (new 
codepoints needed for old ciphers) and the new are not backwards compatible 
with the old (they'll just be ignored). We actually risk misconfiguration in 
the future if the distinction isn't made clear. I think it's time we just 
renamed TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0. There are major changes, so labeling it a major 
version seems more appropriate.

Note that contrary to what some people seem to think, version numbers are not 
completely without meaning. To someone who doesn't really know/care that much 
what TLS is, making sure to use the latest major version of a security protocol 
carries more weight than a minor version. It also makes it clear that there are 
new features here (e.g. 0-RTT). There's some de facto standardization in 
versioning which does carry some useful information. We're not just dealing 
with programmers here; this stuff needs to be clear for managers and 
non-professionals. If we want to get everyone upgraded eventually, messaging is 
important.

Specific proposed changes:
* Mass rename TLS 1.3 to TLS 2.0 in all places (or TLS 2)
* Keep the version ID as { 3, 4 } (already weird counting; changing risks more 
intolerance)
* Rename the new cipher suites to have a "TLS2_" prefix to be less confusing 
for the registry & end configuration
* Add a sentence noting the development history here, and that all documents 
that refer to TLS 1.3 refer to TLS 2.0 (e.g. HTTP/2)

This is a relatively simple set of changes to make that I think can be 
beneficial in the long run, and is essentially just editorial. Rebranding might 
not be something everyone really wants to bother with, but if we expect this to 
be in use for a decade or more (whether we like it or not), we should probably 
make sure to be as clear as possible at the start.


Dave

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