Hi Atul,
On 7/12/16, 3:50 PM, "Atul Luykx" <atul.lu...@esat.kuleuven.be> wrote:
>> To be clear, this probability is that an attacker would be able to
>> take a huge (4+ Petabyte) ciphertext, and a compatibly sized potential
>> (but incorrect) plaintext, and with probability 2^{-32}, be able to
>> determine that this plaintext was not the one used for the ciphertext
>> (and with probability 0.999999999767..., know nothing about whether
>> his guessed plaintext was correct or not).
>
>You need to be careful when making such claims. There are schemes for
>which when you reach the birthday bound you can perform partial key
>recovery.
>
>The probabilities we calculated guarantee that there won't be any
>attacks (with the usual assumptions...). Beyond the bounds, there are no
>guarantees. In particular, you cannot conclude that one, for example,
>loses 1 bit of security once beyond the birthday bound.
How can one use the distinguishing attack with the data complexity bound I
suggested for recovering 1 bit of the encryption key in the context of TLS
?
Regards,
Quynh.
>
>Atul
>
>On 2016-07-12 20:06, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Paterson, Kenny [mailto:kenny.pater...@rhul.ac.uk]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2016 1:17 PM
>>> To: Dang, Quynh (Fed); Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer); Eric Rescorla;
>>> tls@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [TLS] New draft: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14.txt
>>>
>>> Hi
>>>
>>> On 12/07/2016 18:04, "Dang, Quynh (Fed)" <quynh.d...@nist.gov> wrote:
>>>
>>> >Hi Kenny,
>>> >
>>> >On 7/12/16, 12:33 PM, "Paterson, Kenny" <kenny.pater...@rhul.ac.uk>
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >>Finally, you write "to come to the 2^38 record limit, they assume
>>>that
>>> >>each record is the maximum 2^14 bytes". For clarity, we did not
>>> >>recommend a limit of 2^38 records. That's Quynh's preferred number,
>>> >>and is unsupported by our analysis.
>>> >
>>> >What is problem with my suggestion even with the record size being the
>>> >maximum value?
>>>
>>> There may be no problem with your suggestion. I was simply trying to
>>> make it
>>> clear that 2^38 records was your suggestion for the record limit and
>>> not ours.
>>> Indeed, if one reads our note carefully, one will find that we do not
>>> make any
>>> specific recommendations. We consider the decision to be one for the
>>> WG;
>>> our preferred role is to supply the analysis and help interpret it if
>>> people
>>> want that. Part of that involves correcting possible misconceptions
>>> and
>>> misinterpretations before they get out of hand.
>>>
>>> Now 2^38 does come out of our analysis if you are willing to accept
>>> single key
>>> attack security (in the indistinguishability sense) of 2^{-32}. So in
>>> that limited
>>> sense, 2^38 is supported by our analysis. But it is not our
>>> recommendation.
>>>
>>> But, speaking now in a personal capacity, I consider that security
>>> margin to be
>>> too small (i.e. I think that 2^{-32} is too big a success
>>> probability).
>>
>> To be clear, this probability is that an attacker would be able to
>> take a huge (4+ Petabyte) ciphertext, and a compatibly sized potential
>> (but incorrect) plaintext, and with probability 2^{-32}, be able to
>> determine that this plaintext was not the one used for the ciphertext
>> (and with probability 0.999999999767..., know nothing about whether
>> his guessed plaintext was correct or not).
>>
>> I'm just trying to get people to understand what we're talking about.
>> This is not "with probability 2^{-32}, he can recover the plaintext"
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Kenny
>>
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>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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