I’m not sure this helps. 

I’ve never installed a server that is version intolerant. TLS stacks from 
OpenSSL, Microsoft, Java, and most any implementation we can name have been 
version tolerant forever. Certainly none of us can name any implementation that 
at any point had a version out that was tolerant (or implementing) TLS 1.2 but 
intolerant of TLS 1.3.

And these are the same implementations we’re likely to participate in a bakeoff 
or run the suite we create in the hackathon.

Yoav

> On 7 Jun 2016, at 5:22 PM, Kyle Rose <kr...@krose.org> wrote:
> 
> I'm a big fan of the idea of a very strict qualification suite, as well, to 
> try to head off some of these problems before (faulty) implementations 
> proliferate.
> 
> Hackathon?
> 
> Kyle
> 
> On Jun 7, 2016 2:00 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz 
> <mailto:pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
> Dave Garrett <davemgarr...@gmail.com <mailto:davemgarr...@gmail.com>> writes:
> 
> >Also, as with any new system, we now have the ability to loudly stress to TLS
> >1.3+ implementers to not screw it up and test for future-proofing this time
> >around.
> 
> I think that's the main contribution of a new mechanism, it doesn't really
> matter whether it's communicated as a single value, a list, or interpretive
> dance, the main thing is that there needs to be a single location where the
> version is given (not multiple locations that can disagree with each other as
> for TLS < 1.3), and the spec should include a pseudocode algorithm for dealing
> with the version data rather than just "implementations should accept things
> that look about right".
> 
> Peter.
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