On Tue, Mar 15, 2016 at 10:37 AM, David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 8:22 PM Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: > >> David, >> >> Thanks for being patient with me here. Sorry it took so long >> >> As usual, this seems like a question of whether we're going to want a lot >> of flexibility >> (thus motivating orthogonal negotiation) versus whether we're going to >> want little flexibility >> (thus motivating suites). I think that with the historical practice, the >> arguments for orthogonal >> negotiation were a lot stronger, but now that we seem to be leaning >> towards (a) fewer algorithms >> and (b) having algorithms which are themselves suites, I do agree that >> the pendulum is swinging >> more towards suites. >> > > I would probably characterize it less as suites vs orthogonality, but as > wanting to keep divisions in meaningful and universal places and not > splitting up tightly-coupled decisions. The flexibility from orthogonality > can be handy, but going too far---as I believe TLS 1.2 did with signature, > prehash, and curve---complicates everything. Imagine if negotiating > AES_128_GCM required separately negotiating block cipher AES-128, mode CTR, > and MAC GHASH. > Like I said, it's a balance :) On balance, I guess, I'm neutral-to-supportive of this change in general, >> if others in the WG want >> to make it. On the details: >> >> - It seems like we could let measurements tell us what code points we >> need. If we never see >> P256-SHA512 in the wild, then we don't need it (and can add it later if >> needed). >> > > I guess this relates to the fun issue of how TLS sigalgs interacts with > X.509. If we believe they are at most a hint for X.509, then I think we can > freely declare that TLS 1.3+ requires curve/hash matching for NIST curves. > Unlike PKCS#1 v1.5, I doubt anyone has smartcards that can only sign > P384-SHA256. > > If we believe that non-matching certificates are forbidden in TLS, then, > yeah, it's a concern. > I think we concluded that they weren't forbidden, but I believe it would be best if they generally matched. - If we decide to allow PKCS#1 v1.5 for in-protocol signatures, then we'll >> probably want to define >> code points for 1.5 in both in-protocol (CertificateVerify) and >> certificates to distinguish these. >> > > Oh? Why would they need to be separate? The others defined for both aren't. > The idea here would be that we want to be able to deprecate the use of v1.5 in CertificateVerify before its us in certs (which we can't deprecate for quite some time). -Ekr > > David > > >> As far as process, it seemed like people were generally positive about >> this in this discussion, >> but I'll rely on the chairs to determine consensus. >> >> -Ekr >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 9:16 AM, David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 8:23 PM Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 5:19 PM, David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 8:07 PM Dave Garrett <davemgarr...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, January 15, 2016 03:45:34 pm David Benjamin wrote: >>>>>> > This is a proposal for revising SignatureAlgorithm/HashAlgorithm. >>>>>> In TLS >>>>>> > 1.2, signature algorithms are spread across the handshake. >>>>>> [...] >>>>>> > I propose we fold the negotiable parameters under one name. >>>>>> [...] >>>>>> > 2. Remove HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm, >>>>>> SignatureAndHashAlgorithm as >>>>>> > they are. Introduce a new SignatureAlgorithm u16 type and negotiate >>>>>> that >>>>>> > instead. >>>>>> >>>>>> I previously proposed this here: >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg18035.html >>>>>> >>>>>> ekr was against it, though it hasn't been discussed that throughly. >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg18036.html >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Ah, thanks! I must have missed this discussion. Or perhaps I saw it >>>>> and forgot. >>>>> >>>>> ekr, are you still against this sort of thing? I think the new CFRG >>>>> signature algorithms tying decisions together is a good argument for why >>>>> we'd want this. If we believe this trend is to continue (and I hope it >>>>> does. Ed25519 is a nice and simple interface), trying to decompose it all >>>>> seems poor. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not sure. I agree that the CFRG thing seems to be a new >>>> development. I'll >>>> try to confirm my previous opinion or develop a new one over the >>>> weekend :) >>>> >>> >>> ekr, did you have confirmed or new thoughts on this change? >>> >>> From elsewhere in the thread, I put together a draft PR if you wanted >>> something to look at in that form. >>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/404 >>> It incorporated some of the suggestions in the thread (not mentioning >>> the really legacy values, pairing NIST curves with hashes, etc.), but >>> that's not the important part. The meat of the proposal is unifying >>> signature algorithms under one number and a shared interface, which I think >>> is a valuable simplification. >>> >>> David >>> >> >>
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
