If you're fixing that then maybe standardising the errors makes sense too.
My fingerprinter sees the following:

For an empty name:

SNIEmptyName: *(301)alert:DecodeError:fatal|
SNIEmptyName: *(301)alert:HandshakeFailure:fatal|
SNIEmptyName: *(301)alert:IllegalParameter:fatal|
SNIEmptyName: *(303)alert:UnexpectedMesage:fatal|
SNIEmptyName: error:Unexpected EOF receiving record header - server closed
connection|

For a long name (x repeated 500 times):

SNILongName: *(301)alert:HandshakeFailure:fatal|
SNILongName: *(301)alert:IllegalParameter:fatal|
SNILongName: *(301)alert:UnrecognizedName:fatal|
SNILongName: *(303)alert:UnexpectedMesage:fatal|
SNILongName: error:Unexpected EOF receiving record header - server closed
connection|

Rich.


On 3 March 2016 at 22:44, Martin Thomson <martin.thom...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 4 March 2016 at 05:49, Adam Langley <a...@imperialviolet.org> wrote:
> > (I think the lesson here is that protocols should have a single joint,
> > and that it should be kept well oiled. For TLS, that means that
> > extensions should have minimal extensionality in themselves and that
> > we should generally rely on the main extensions mechanism for these
> > sorts of things.)
>
> Big +1
>
> Note that the NSS bug also entailed non-zero SNI name types
> overwriting the actual SNI.
>
> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
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