Tony Arcieri wrote:
[ Charset UTF-8 unsupported, converting... ]
> Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>
>> The vulnerabilities shown in the SLOTH paper were based on the fact that
>> implementations still allow MD5 for authentication/integrity protection,
>> even if (for example) it's explicitly disabled in the config.
>> So the problem wasn't a fault in the protocol, it's buggy implementations
>> (as it was for ones that allowed 512-bit keys, non-prime primes,
>> and so on). Throwing out TLS 1.1 based on this seems rather premature.
Actually no, the TLSv1.2 made a few terribly braindead design choices
- newly introduce raw md5RSA digital signatures into TLSv1.2 in 2008
where all prior TLS protocol versions, including SSLv3 had been using
the concatenation SHA-1||MD5
- making the sha1RSA rather than sha256RSA digital signature algorithm
the default and mandatory-to-implement algorithm for use with TLSv1.2(!!)
although it was well-known weaker than the algorithm (SHA-1||MD5)
in all earlier TLS protocol versions, including SSLv3,
and in spite of SHA-1 already being officially scheduled for end-of-life
2 years later (NIST, SP800-57 pt.1 rev2)
This is ridiculous considering that SHA-256 is mandatory-to-use
in the TLSv1.2 PRF.
- failing to adjust the truncation of the HMAC output in the
TLSv1.2 Finished handshake message to be at least half the size of
the underlying hash function (SHA-256), see RFC 2104 Section 5:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104#section-5
>
> My understanding is TLS 1.2 specifically was amended to allow MD5
> signatures even though this was not the case in previous TLS versions, or
> at least that was the claim of the miTLS presenters on SLOTH at
> RealWorldCrypto 2016.
>
> If this is the case, this seems like a big regression in TLS 1.2.
And a fairly well-known & discussed regression, e.g.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10664.html
that was subsequently removed in OpenSSL 1.0.1f in January 2014,
i.e. 2 years before the SLOTH paper.
I'm also wondering whether it might be misleading to lump the
(in)significance of the currently known collisions for HMAC-SHA1
and HMAC-MD5 together with the (in)significance for
(general, low-frequent) digital signatures and together with
PKCS#10 & Certificate-issuance design flaw that enables a
mere collision attack to achieve what would normally require
a successful 2nd preimage attack.
Compare the Security Considerations of rfc2104 for the (in)significance
of current collision attacks for HMAC.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104#section-6
-Martin
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
