Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote:

> Sorry, I'm still confused TLS 1.2 uses a specific PRF. TLS 1.3 uses HKDF.
> Are you suggesting TLS 1.2 use the TLS 1.2 PRF with SHA-512 and that
> TLS 1.2 use SHA-512 with HKDF, or something different?
>
I mean that TLS 1.2 should use SHA-512 with the TLS 1.2 PRF and that TLS
1.3 should use SHA-512 with HKDF.


> Nobody should pay attention to what the MTI cipher suite for TLS 1.2 is,
>> because it's obsolete; in fact, one would be making a huge mistake to
>> deploy it now if one's application didn't have legacy backward
>> compatibility concerns. And, we should change the MTI cipher suite for TLS
>> 1.3 to the ChaCha20-Poly1305 ones, because they solve a lot of problems.
>> For example, they remove any question of any need to implement rekeying,
>> they avoid the weird IV construction hacks that are necessary for 128-bit
>> cipher suites like AES-GCM, and they can be implemented efficiently in a
>> safe way, unlike AES-GCM.
>>
>
> This seems like a separate question.
>

You are the one that brought the MTI stuff into this, not me.


> SHA-256-using cipher suites are widely deployed and not going away any
> time soon, so what resource are you trying to conserve here?
>

I'm trying to minimize the number of algorithms (amount of code) necessary
to implement ChaCha20-Poly1305 using x25519 for key agreement and Ed25519
for signatures. The different between needing or not needing SHA-256
matters most for very small computers (AVR and Cortex-M0), but doesn't
really matter much for larger computers where SHA-256 has an advantage.

In particular, since there seems to be a notable amount of hardware that is
or will soon be released that optimized for
ChaCha20-Poly1305+x25519+Ed25519, because of Apple HomeKit, it would be
nice to take advantage of that for TLS.

Besides that, the inconsistency regarding why these new
256-bit-encryption-key cipher suites are currently defined to use SHA-256
in the PRF whereas all the existing 256-bit-encryption-key cipher suites
use SHA-384 seems strange. Even if an application wants to use AES-GCM
cipher suites, it would be able to avoid needing SHA-256 if it implemented
the AES256-GCM cipher suites instead of AES128-GCM.

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
https://briansmith.org/
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

Reply via email to