Hi folks, I've merged a bunch of PRs into the editor's draft, including:
- https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/316 The new structure for client auth and post-handshake client auth we discussed in Yokohama. - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/342 Using the "normal" content types for 0-RTT data and close_notify to indicate the end of the 0-RTT application data. - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/352 - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/317 Use SHA-1 to control what we sign with. - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/284 The anti-downgrade mechanism that Karthik proposed - https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/345 Updating the IANA considerations per the discussion in Yokohama. This clears out the big pipeline stall from PR#316, but probably has created some bustage. Expect a series of cleanup commits and some other things that were head-of-line blocked this week and then draft-11 in the next week or so. Please file PRs and/or github issues for any issues you see. In addition, PR#354 (https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/354) implements the rekey mechanism that we discussed in Yokohama. There was broad agreement to adopt something like this. I would appreciate it if a few people could give it a sanity check, but absent strong objections, I intend to merge this PR on Friday. We also need to discuss three more substantive technical issues: - Encrypted SNI. - Whether the 0-RTT handshake messages are hashed into the handshake hash. - Statelessness for HelloRetryRequest, and in particular cookie lifetime. I'll be starting threads on those over the next few days with the aim of resolving them promptly. -Ekr
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