On Thu, Oct 22, 2015 at 11:20 AM, Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com> wrote:
> > If we (okay, not "we", library implementors) require explicit > application opt- > > in to TLS 1.3, the adoption rate is probably not going to be very good. > So, yes, > > I think applications should start using TLS 1.3 without any changes. > > And what about 0RTT? Removed support for some crypto? Various other > semantic changes? > So, I think we've agreed that using 0-RTT should require explicit action. And similarly if you have required some crypto algorithm that TLS 1.3 doesn't support (or you don't support any of the new ones) it should fail. However, if you are using a conceptually compatible subset of TLS 1.2 (i.e., modern algorithms, no renegotiation), then I would expect you to be able to drop in TLS 1.3 and have it work. -Ekr What you're really saying is "just like it always used to be, just better." > > And I want a pony. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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