Hi, Please find our new version from of the Session Key Interface for TLS and DTLS.
The main motivation for this interface is that the private key is centralized in a Key Server instead of being distributed and copied among the Edge Servers. All cryptographic operation are performed by the Key Server and the Edge Server uses this interface. Feel free to comment the draft but here are some our concerns and we would like to know your opinion: QUESTION 1) An interaction occurs when RSA or ephemeral Diffie Hellman (DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA or ECDHE_ECDSA) key agreement . In your opinion, should we consider RSA? QUESTION 2) When Diffie Hellman is used, to build the signature, the Edge Server provides all parameters to the key Server, and the Key Server hashes and signs. An alternative would be the Edge Server hashes and requests the Key Server to sign it. We believe the first alternative is more secure, but the second generates less load on the network . Do you have any opinion regarding these two alternatives. BR, Daniel -----Original Message----- From: internet-dra...@ietf.org [mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org] Sent: Monday, October 19, 2015 7:59 PM To: Kelsey Cairns; John Mattsson; Daniel Migault; Robert Skog Subject: New Version Notification for draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface-01.txt A new version of I-D, draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface-01.txt has been successfully submitted by John Mattsson and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface Revision: 01 Title: Session Key Interface (SKI) for TLS and DTLS Document date: 2015-10-19 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 24 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface-01.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface-01 Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-cairns-tls-session-key-interface-01 Abstract: This document describes a session key interface that can be used for TLS and DTLS. The Heartbleed attack has clearly illustrated the security problems with storing private keys in the memory of the TLS server. Hardware Security Modules (HSM) offer better protection but are inflexible, especially as more (D)TLS servers are running on virtualized servers in data centers. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
