On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 12:02:38PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Fri 2015-10-02 12:24:24 -0400, Martin Rex wrote: > > > But the collateral damage is that you break stuff that feeds on the > > outer record layer structure and state, which can easily push adoption > > of TLSv1.3 from the 5-years-spec-to-usage for TLSv1.2 to the > > 15-years-spec-to-marginal-use marginal use seen with IPv6. > > Can you enumerate the stuff you expect to break from encrypted content > type that will cause a decade-long delay in adoption? It would be great > to have a list of those things so we can evaluate them.
I personally would expect that anything that would be broken by content type encryption is already broken by fixing the handshake (it has number of known flaws). That version number field that has absolutely no use in encrypted records is still there... For compatiblity. Also, new user protocols (like TLS) are much much easier to deploy than new addressing protocols (like IPv6). And the stuff that breaks... Probably some badly done "middleware" in "enterprise" environment. -Ilari _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
