Hi Simon, two technical typos:
The example cert in 8.2 has the wrong OID for the signature.
Cert has { 1 3 101 100 1 } [encoding 06 04 2B656401]
Text has { 1 3 101 101 } [encoding 06 03 2B6565] for id-EdDSASignature
OIDs use space-separated (not dot-separated) numbers in ASN.1.
Section 4:
Wrong { 1.3.101.100 }
Right { 1 3 101 100 }
Section 7
Wrong { 1.3.101.101 }
Right { 1 3 101 101 }
The cert's notBefore field is a UTCTime value (2-digit year), while the
notAfter field is a GeneralizedTime value (4-digit year). I don't think I has
seen that before, but it is valid.
--
James Manger
-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Simon Josefsson
Sent: Wednesday, 23 September 2015 6:33 PM
To: p...@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Updated EdDSA/Ed25519 PKIX document
Hi all,
I have pushed out a new version of the document describing EdDSA public keys,
signatures and certificates for PKIX. The change in -03 include the addition
of the prehash mode, test vectors generated by GnuTLS, and a section
recommending certain human readable names.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-pkix-eddsa-03
I've started a thread to discuss whether it is wortwhile to be able to use the
same Ed25519 key for both PureEdDSA mode and HashEdDSA signing, and I'd
appreciate feedback on whether people are interested in this and generally if
it is a good idea or not. The complexity involved make me shy away a bit from
it, but it is fun to consider. The thread is here:
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2015/000630.html
/Simon
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