On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:35 PM, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluh...@cisco.com
> wrote:

> I recently reviewed the most recent TLS 1.3 draft, and I must say that I
> am impressed; the protocol appears to be a significant improvement.  In
> particular, you simplify the protocol significantly, and as we all know,
> complexity is the enemy of security.  You also drop many of the weak
> options, such as RC4 and the export ciphers; that sounds like an excellent
> idea.
>
>
>
> That said, I do see a few things that puzzle me:
>
>
>
> -          When dealing with ECDSA signatures, the default hash algorithm
> is SHA1, and any other hash function needs to be specified explicitly.
> Might I ask why that is?  No one has demonstrated a SHA1 collision yet;
> however people are creeping closer.  If you ask me (which you didn’t, but
> I’ll give my opinion anyways), the default should be (at least) SHA-256;
> you should allow SHA-1 as a downgrade option only if someone makes a strong
> case that they can implement ECDSA and the rest of TLS 1.3, but
> implementing SHA-256 is just too hard.  Otherwise, it should be discarded
> just like the other known weak cryptographical primitives (such as RC4).
>
> -          You also allow the provision of someone using MD5 as the hash
> algorithm.  Take the above comments about how SHA-1 is not a good idea, and
> multiply it by a factor of about 10.  I see no justification for allowing
> someone to use a known broken hash algorithm.
>

This is just a transient state. We have patches in progress to remove both
of these.

-          Given the general theme of simplification, I was a bit puzzled
> by something; you appear to provide two different solutions to “how do I
> quickly reestablish a TLS tunnel”; you have both 0-RTT and session
> resumption.  While both appear to have minor advantages over the other, I
> don’t immediately see any real justification for including the complexity
> of both.  Now, it might be that I’m catching a draft in the middle, and
> that you fully intend to combine them.  Alternatively, there might be
> strong reasons to have both (and it just doesn’t occur to me). In either of
> those two cases, “never mind”
>

Each of these has some benefit, though I agree that it would be nice to
combine them.
The big issue is:

- For security reasons it's much easier to work with 0-RTT DH exchanges.
- For performance reasons it's nice to have resumption.

-Ekr


>
>
> However, despite these minor nits, I would end with saying that the
> working group has done good work on this draft; I look forward to the end
> product.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
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