libkeynote: conversion for opaque DSA/RSA

[Theo Buehler]

This is completely mechanical, but a second set of eyes won't hurt.

It won't build on -current since the API will only be exposed in the
next bump.

Index: auxil.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libkeynote/auxil.c,v
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -p -r1.11 auxil.c
--- auxil.c     14 Dec 2015 03:35:40 -0000      1.11
+++ auxil.c     11 Jan 2022 12:07:17 -0000
@@ -53,22 +53,22 @@ keynote_keyhash(void *key, int alg)
     {
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_DSA:
            dsa = (DSA *) key;
-           res += BN_mod_word(dsa->p, HASHTABLESIZE);
-           res += BN_mod_word(dsa->q, HASHTABLESIZE);
-           res += BN_mod_word(dsa->g, HASHTABLESIZE);
-           res += BN_mod_word(dsa->pub_key, HASHTABLESIZE);
+           res += BN_mod_word(DSA_get0_p(dsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
+           res += BN_mod_word(DSA_get0_q(dsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
+           res += BN_mod_word(DSA_get0_g(dsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
+           res += BN_mod_word(DSA_get0_pub_key(dsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
            return res % HASHTABLESIZE;
 
         case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA:
            rsa = (RSA *) key;
-            res += BN_mod_word(rsa->n, HASHTABLESIZE);
-            res += BN_mod_word(rsa->e, HASHTABLESIZE);
+            res += BN_mod_word(RSA_get0_n(rsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
+            res += BN_mod_word(RSA_get0_e(rsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
            return res % HASHTABLESIZE;
 
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_X509: /* RSA-specific */
            rsa = (RSA *) key;
-            res += BN_mod_word(rsa->n, HASHTABLESIZE);
-            res += BN_mod_word(rsa->e, HASHTABLESIZE);
+            res += BN_mod_word(RSA_get0_n(rsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
+            res += BN_mod_word(RSA_get0_e(rsa), HASHTABLESIZE);
            return res % HASHTABLESIZE;
 
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_BINARY:
Index: signature.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libkeynote/signature.c,v
retrieving revision 1.27
diff -u -p -r1.27 signature.c
--- signature.c 24 Nov 2021 04:32:52 -0000      1.27
+++ signature.c 11 Jan 2022 12:07:17 -0000
@@ -588,10 +588,10 @@ kn_keycompare(void *key1, void *key2, in
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_DSA:
            p1 = (DSA *) key1;
            p2 = (DSA *) key2;
-           if (!BN_cmp(p1->p, p2->p) &&
-               !BN_cmp(p1->q, p2->q) &&
-               !BN_cmp(p1->g, p2->g) &&
-               !BN_cmp(p1->pub_key, p2->pub_key))
+           if (!BN_cmp(DSA_get0_p(p1), DSA_get0_p(p2)) &&
+               !BN_cmp(DSA_get0_q(p1), DSA_get0_q(p2)) &&
+               !BN_cmp(DSA_get0_g(p1), DSA_get0_g(p2)) &&
+               !BN_cmp(DSA_get0_pub_key(p1), DSA_get0_pub_key(p2)))
              return RESULT_TRUE;
            else
              return RESULT_FALSE;
@@ -599,8 +599,8 @@ kn_keycompare(void *key1, void *key2, in
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_X509:
             p3 = (RSA *) key1;
             p4 = (RSA *) key2;
-            if (!BN_cmp(p3->n, p4->n) &&
-                !BN_cmp(p3->e, p4->e))
+            if (!BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(p3), RSA_get0_n(p4)) &&
+                !BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(p3), RSA_get0_e(p4)))
               return RESULT_TRUE;
             else
              return RESULT_FALSE;
@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ kn_keycompare(void *key1, void *key2, in
        case KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA:
             p3 = (RSA *) key1;
             p4 = (RSA *) key2;
-            if (!BN_cmp(p3->n, p4->n) &&
-                !BN_cmp(p3->e, p4->e))
+            if (!BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(p3), RSA_get0_n(p4)) &&
+                !BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(p3), RSA_get0_e(p4)))
               return RESULT_TRUE;
             else
              return RESULT_FALSE;