This is needed for the upcoming libcrypto bump. The code is essentially
the same as in npppd(8), so it has the same issue: several layers of
void functions that make error checking hard to add.
Index: usr.sbin/radiusctl/chap_ms.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/radiusctl/chap_ms.c,v
retrieving revision 1.1
diff -u -p -r1.1 chap_ms.c
--- usr.sbin/radiusctl/chap_ms.c 21 Jul 2015 04:06:04 -0000 1.1
+++ usr.sbin/radiusctl/chap_ms.c 5 Jan 2022 09:57:43 -0000
@@ -134,19 +134,21 @@ mschap_challenge_response(u_int8_t *chal
void
mschap_ntpassword_hash(u_int8_t *in, int inlen, u_int8_t *hash)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_int mdlen;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_md4());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, in, inlen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_md4());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, in, inlen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
}
void
mschap_challenge_hash(u_int8_t *peer_challenge, u_int8_t *auth_challenge,
u_int8_t *username, int usernamelen, u_int8_t *challenge)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_int8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int mdlen;
u_int8_t *name;
@@ -156,11 +158,13 @@ mschap_challenge_hash(u_int8_t *peer_cha
else
name++;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_SZ);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, auth_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_SZ);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, name, strlen(name));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, peer_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_SZ);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, auth_challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_SZ);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, name, strlen(name));
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
memcpy(challenge, md, MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_SZ);
}
@@ -185,7 +189,7 @@ mschap_auth_response(u_int8_t *password,
u_int8_t *ntresponse, u_int8_t *auth_challenge, u_int8_t *peer_challenge,
u_int8_t *username, int usernamelen, u_int8_t *auth_response)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_int8_t password_hash[MSCHAP_HASH_SZ];
u_int8_t password_hash2[MSCHAP_HASH_SZ];
u_int8_t challenge[MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_SZ];
@@ -210,20 +214,23 @@ mschap_auth_response(u_int8_t *password,
mschap_ntpassword_hash(password, passwordlen, password_hash);
mschap_ntpassword_hash(password_hash, MSCHAP_HASH_SZ, password_hash2);
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, password_hash2, sizeof(password_hash2));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ntresponse, 24);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, magic1, 39);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, password_hash2, sizeof(password_hash2));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, ntresponse, 24);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, magic1, 39);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
mschap_challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge,
username, usernamelen, challenge);
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md, sizeof(md));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, magic2, 41);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, md, sizeof(md));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, magic2, 41);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
/*
* Encode the value of 'Digest' as "S=" followed by
@@ -247,18 +254,20 @@ mschap_masterkey(u_int8_t *password_hash
{
u_int8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int mdlen;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
static u_int8_t magic1[27] = {
0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79
};
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, password_hash2, MSCHAP_HASH_SZ);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ntresponse, 24);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, magic1, 27);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, password_hash2, MSCHAP_HASH_SZ);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, ntresponse, 24);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, magic1, 27);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
memcpy(masterkey, md, 16);
}
@@ -267,7 +276,7 @@ void
mschap_asymetric_startkey(u_int8_t *masterkey, u_int8_t *sessionkey,
int sessionkeylen, int issend, int isserver)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_int8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int mdlen;
u_int8_t *s;
@@ -299,12 +308,14 @@ mschap_asymetric_startkey(u_int8_t *mast
else
s = isserver ? magic2 : magic3;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, masterkey, 16);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sha1_pad1, 40);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s, 84);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sha1_pad2, 40);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, masterkey, 16);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sha1_pad1, 40);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, s, 84);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sha1_pad2, 40);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
memcpy(sessionkey, md, sessionkeylen);
}
@@ -336,24 +347,27 @@ void
mschap_radiuskey(u_int8_t *plain, const u_int8_t *crypted,
const u_int8_t *authenticator, const u_int8_t *secret)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_int8_t b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], p[32];
u_int i, mdlen;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_md5());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, secret, strlen(secret));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, authenticator, 16);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, crypted, 2);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, b, &mdlen);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_md5());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret, strlen(secret));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, authenticator, 16);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, crypted, 2);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, b, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) {
p[i] = b[i] ^ crypted[i+2];
}
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_md5());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, secret, strlen(secret));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, crypted + 2, mdlen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, b, &mdlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_md5());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret, strlen(secret));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, crypted + 2, mdlen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, b, &mdlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) {
p[i+16] = b[i] ^ crypted[i+18];
