On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 11:28:50AM +0000, Stuart Henderson wrote:
> The model is: only the specific keys placed in /etc/signify are trusted.
>
> The plan is to include the public keys used for signing release n+1 in
> release n. So once you trust a particular key, by verifying signatures
> on sets which you download+install, you can have a chain of continuity
> for future keys.
>
> You still need to get your initial key from somewhere that you
> trust. If you are worried about sources of this, you can at least
> check and compare the 55*.pub files from a few sources e.g. those in
> downloaded sets against those in anoncvs/cvsweb ("cvs -d $CVSROOT get
> -p src/etc/signify/55base.pub" to display on stdout). Of course when
> the next release is done they'll be on CD.
>
> (IIRC somebody suggested printing keys on the tshirts, not sure if print
> resolution on fabric is really up to that without making the text so
> big as to be horribly ugly, posters may work though.)
>
> Given sufficient space to download tgz before unpacking, the install
> ramdisk kernel now checks signatures (yes: crypto fits on the ramdisk
> - signify/ed25519 is small, and yes: please test and report on any
> problems!).
>
> If you're fetching a new installer (ramdisk kernel, install55.iso,
> floppy*.fs, etc) you can verify the signature of that file before using
> it. Also it should go without saying, if you use the "untar sets on a
> running system" method, checking those sets is your responsibility,
> see signify(1)'s EXAMPLES section for information about how to do this.
What about as TXT record for dns (in combination with DNSSEC) as alternative
for getting the key? :)
jirib
