> On 2 Nov 2014, at 13:22, Ian Lepore <i...@freebsd.org> wrote: > > On Sun, 2014-11-02 at 09:45 +0000, Mark R V Murray wrote: >> Hi DES, >> >> I´m scared witless of this being on-by-default, for the reason given in the >> removed comment. I´d much prefer to see it only turned on if a kernel option >> is set, and the embedded folks /et al/ can use that. >> >> Please reinstate the #ifdef RANDOM_AUTOSEED, and set a kernel option to turn >> it on. Please also leave the comment; summarily turning on an unprepared >> generator is not going to be obvious to anyone but an attacker. >> >> Moving the point of the auto-firstseed to where is good, thanks. >> >> M >> > > To give you some idea of how usable this new stuff is on a system that > isn't an x86 server or someone's desktop or laptop... after commenting > out the postrandom so that a board would at least boot (but before DES' > resend change), I left a board sitting idle at the login prompt. It was > somewhere between 40 minutes and an hour before I saw this: > > FreeBSD/arm (rpi) (ttyu0) > > login: random: reseed - fast - thresh 96,1 - 0 48 0 0 0 130 0 0 620 0 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 > random: reseed - slow - thresh 128,2 - 0 44 0 0 0 130 0 0 619 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 0 > random: unblocking device.
Thanks for doing this, Ian. This is good information, and tells me a lot about Yarrow on some systems. > Securing a system against some theoretical attack has value only to the > point where the system is no longer usable at all. At that point you > kind of have to declare the attacker the winner, and he didn't even have > to actually launch an attack. Point conceded. :-) M -- Mark R V Murray _______________________________________________ svn-src-head@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-src-head To unsubscribe, send any mail to "svn-src-head-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"
