Author: delphij
Date: Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
New Revision: 271305
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/271305
Log:
Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities:
The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS handshake message may cause OpenSSL
to consume large amounts of memory. [CVE-2014-3506]
The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS packet could cause OpenSSL to leak
memory. [CVE-2014-3507]
A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from
the stack. [CVE-2014-3508]
OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to
a denial of service attack. [CVE-2014-3510]
Security: CVE-2014-3506, CVE-2014-3507, CVE-2014-3508, CVE-2014-3510
Security: FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
Approved by: so
Modified:
releng/8.4/UPDATING
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
releng/9.1/UPDATING
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
releng/9.2/UPDATING
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh
releng/9.3/UPDATING
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
releng/9.3/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
releng/9.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh
Modified: releng/8.4/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014 (r271305)
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 8.
debugging tools present in HEAD were left in place because
sun4v support still needs work to become production ready.
+20140909: p15 FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
+ Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:18]
+
20140708: p14 FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem
FreeBSD-EN-14:09.jail
Fix kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -285,16 +285,28 @@ err:
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
+
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ int i, length;
+
+ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
+ * Need at least one content octet.
+ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+ length = (int)len;
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT
else ret=(*a);
p= *pp;
- if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+ if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
- ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+ ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
if (ret->data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
}
- memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
- ret->length=(int)len;
+ memcpy(ret->data,p,length);
+ ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
- p+=len;
+ p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -444,11 +444,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
unsigned char *p;
char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
- buf[0]='\0';
- return(0);
- }
+ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+ return(0);
if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
{
@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i=(int)(l/40);
l-=(long)(i*40);
}
- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
{
*buf++ = i + '0';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
n++;
@@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i = strlen(bndec);
if (buf)
{
- if (buf_len > 0)
+ if (buf_len > 1)
{
*buf++ = '.';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(ok);
}
-
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -580,29 +580,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s,
return 0;
}
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
PQ_64BIT seq64;
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
- */
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <
s->max_cert_list)
- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
- else
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
/* Try to find item in queue */
pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
@@ -632,7 +635,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
- * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
*/
if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
{
@@ -652,7 +656,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -680,21 +686,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
i = -1;
}
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+ * would never have reached this branch. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr,
int *ok)
{
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -714,7 +724,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
* don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
*/
- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
item = NULL;
/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -739,9 +749,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
}
else
{
- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -753,7 +766,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already
been read) */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
}
@@ -765,14 +780,21 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
if ( item == NULL)
goto err;
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+ * been discarded. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -796,6 +796,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate
with SSL_kRSA. */
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
@@ -986,6 +993,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
@@ -1226,5 +1240,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-
-
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -328,23 +328,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and
we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like
this,
- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol
version downgrade
- * attacks. */
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
-#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
-#else
- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to
client_version */
@@ -412,14 +408,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+ if (n < 9)
+ {
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+ * packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -1913,6 +1913,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate
with SSL_kRSA. */
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
Modified: releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
TYPE="FreeBSD"
REVISION="8.4"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p14"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p15"
if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
fi
Modified: releng/9.1/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014 (r271305)
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ handbook.
Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
/usr/ports/UPDATING. Please read that file before running portupgrade.
+20140909: p18 FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
+ Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:18]
+
20140708: p17 FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem
Fix kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP
notifications. [SA-14:17]
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -285,16 +285,28 @@ err:
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
+
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ int i, length;
+
+ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
+ * Need at least one content octet.
+ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+ length = (int)len;
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT
else ret=(*a);
p= *pp;
- if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+ if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
- ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+ ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
if (ret->data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
}
- memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
- ret->length=(int)len;
+ memcpy(ret->data,p,length);
+ ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
- p+=len;
+ p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -444,11 +444,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
unsigned char *p;
char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
- buf[0]='\0';
- return(0);
- }
+ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+ return(0);
if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
{
@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i=(int)(l/40);
l-=(long)(i*40);
}
- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
{
*buf++ = i + '0';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
n++;
@@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i = strlen(bndec);
if (buf)
{
- if (buf_len > 0)
+ if (buf_len > 1)
{
*buf++ = '.';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(ok);
}
-
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -580,29 +580,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s,
return 0;
}
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
PQ_64BIT seq64;
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
- */
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <
s->max_cert_list)
- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
- else
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
/* Try to find item in queue */
pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
@@ -632,7 +635,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
- * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
*/
if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
{
@@ -652,7 +656,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -680,21 +686,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
i = -1;
}
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+ * would never have reached this branch. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr,
int *ok)
{
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -714,7 +724,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
* don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
*/
- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
item = NULL;
/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -739,9 +749,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
}
else
{
- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -753,7 +766,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already
been read) */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
}
@@ -765,14 +780,21 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
if ( item == NULL)
goto err;
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+ * been discarded. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -796,6 +796,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate
with SSL_kRSA. */
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
@@ -986,6 +993,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
@@ -1226,5 +1240,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-
-
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -328,23 +328,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and
we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like
this,
- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol
version downgrade
- * attacks. */
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
-#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
-#else
- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to
client_version */
@@ -412,14 +408,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+ if (n < 9)
+ {
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+ * packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -1913,6 +1913,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate
with SSL_kRSA. */
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
Modified: releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
TYPE="FreeBSD"
REVISION="9.1"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p17"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p18"
if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
fi
Modified: releng/9.2/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.2/UPDATING Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014 (r271305)
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ handbook:
Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
/usr/ports/UPDATING. Please read that file before running portupgrade.
+20140909: p11 FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
+ Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:18]
+
20140708: p10 FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem
Fix kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP
notifications. [SA-14:17]
Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -285,16 +285,28 @@ err:
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
+
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ int i, length;
+
+ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
+ * Need at least one content octet.
+ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+ length = (int)len;
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT
else ret=(*a);
p= *pp;
- if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+ if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
- ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+ ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
if (ret->data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
}
- memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
- ret->length=(int)len;
+ memcpy(ret->data,p,length);
+ ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
- p+=len;
+ p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;
Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46
2014 (r271304)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46
2014 (r271305)
@@ -444,11 +444,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
unsigned char *p;
char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
- buf[0]='\0';
- return(0);
- }
+ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+ return(0);
if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
{
@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i=(int)(l/40);
l-=(long)(i*40);
}
- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
{
*buf++ = i + '0';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
n++;
@@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len,
i = strlen(bndec);
if (buf)
{
- if (buf_len > 0)
+ if (buf_len > 1)
{
*buf++ = '.';
+ *buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(ok);
}
-
Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:09:46 2014
(r271304)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c Tue Sep 9 10:13:46 2014
(r271305)
@@ -580,29 +580,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s,
return 0;
}
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
PQ_64BIT seq64;
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
- */
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <
s->max_cert_list)
- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
- else
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
/* Try to find item in queue */
pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
@@ -632,7 +635,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
- * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
*/
if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
{
@@ -652,7 +656,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
*** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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