CVSROOT: /cvs
Module name: src
Changes by: [email protected] 2026/03/31 07:58:05
Modified files:
lib/libcrypto/x509: x509_verify.c
Log message:
Fix an off-by-one error in the X.509 verifier depth checking.
In x509_verify_build_chains(), ensure that we check the current depth
against max_depth prior to turning it into a legacy-style depth index.
Additionally, add a guard to x509_verify_chain_append() so that we avoid
exceeding the maximum certs per chain, even if we fail to handle this
correctly elsewhere. Also prevent the legacy callback from being able
to override the maximum verification depth.
The current off-by-one allows for a 4 byte overwrite to occur on heap
allocated memory - this will likely trigger a crash on OpenBSD (but may
go unnoticed elsewhere). This is only reachable if a TLS client is talking
to a malicious server or if a TLS server has client certificate
verification enabled - in both cases the verification depth also needs to
be set to the maximum allowed value of 32.
It is worth noting that many TLS clients/servers set the maximum
verification depth to a value that is much less than the default. A libtls
client or server uses a default depth of 6 and is not impacted in this
configuration.
Thanks to Calif.io in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research,
for reporting the issue.
ok tb@
