In article <[email protected]>, Jean-Yves Migeon <[email protected]> wrote: >On 24.06.2011 00:50, Christos Zoulas wrote: >> Module Name: src >> Committed By: christos >> Date: Thu Jun 23 22:50:54 UTC 2011 >> >> Modified Files: >> src/usr.bin/pmap: main.c >> >> Log Message: >> Don't give out information about processes we can't control. > >Thanks to Aleksey and you for fixing the procfs leak. > >I wonder whether pmap's code is the right place to check for >"information" access control. It's difficult to modify except by >patching the source, does not protect from abusing/finding exploits to >circumvent the check (any executable that has kmem sgid rights is a >target), and there are other potential tools usable out there (lsof(1), >maybe?). > >Isn't it something that rather fits the kauth(9) ACLs?
We need to kill all the setgid kmem grovelers and use sysctl/procfs to get data from the kernel. If one decides to compile and install setuid or setgid programs that have information leaks, it is not NetBSD's fault.. christos
