Hi, all. It’s been quiet in keyserver land recently, but I recently published four proposals for how to move forward on the Hockeypuck github blog, and all feedback is welcome:
HIP 2: SKS v2 protocol
Sync using hashes of self-sig packets rather than hashes of TPKs would
mitigate several well-known issues with the SKS protocol. This proposal evolved
out of previous discussions around decomposing TPKs into atoms. tl;dr: you
don’t have to decompose into atoms, just pretend to the recon protocol that you
did.
https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-2:-SKS-v2-protocol
HIP 3: Timestamp-aware merge strategy
1pa3pc is a great idea, but it’s still a long way off standardisation
and requires updates to all clients. But we don’t need actual attested
signatures if keyservers treat the most recent self-sig anywhere on the key as
equivalent to an attestation sig, and infer the same behaviour from it.
https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-3:-Timestamp-aware-merge-strategy
HIP 4: Third-party revocation sig distribution
Both 1pa3pc and HIP 3 above can prevent the distribution of third-party
revocation signatures, meaning that a malicious actor could strip third-party
revocations from the keyserver copy of his key and pass it off as still
certified. Distributing revocations with the _signing_ key rather than the
signee avoids this issue.
https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-4:-Third-party-revocation-sig-distribution
HIP 5: Reliable personal data deletion using self-signatures
Previous proposals for automated deletion of personal information from
keyservers have all developed holes under closer scrutiny. Here’s a new attempt
using direct key self-sigs and (potentially?) no protocol changes.
https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-5:-Reliable-personal-data-deletion-using-self-signatures
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Andrew.
(Crossposted to sks-devel, gnupg-devel and hockeypuck-devel)
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