Silklister Cory Doctorow gave an interesting [1] talk at the Chaos
Computer Congress in Berlin recently.

-- b

[1] Interesting in the sense of the old chinese curse [2] kind of interesting.
[2] "May you live in interesting times."


Video: http://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-purp.html

Transcript: http://joshuawise.com/28c3-transcript

Full Text:


Transcript

Introducer:

Anyway, I believe I've killed enough time … so, ladies and gentlemen,
a person who in this crowd needs absolutely no introduction, Cory
Doctorow!

[Audience applauds.]

Doctorow:

27.0 Thank you.

32.0 So, when I speak in places where the first language of the nation
is not English, there is a disclaimer and an apology, because I'm one
of nature's fast talkers. When I was at the United Nations at the
World Intellectual Property Organization, I was known as the “scourge”
of the simultaneous translation corps; I would stand up and speak, and
turn around, and there would be window after window of translator, and
every one of them would be doing this [Doctorow facepalms]. [Audience
laughs] So in advance, I give you permission when I start talking
quickly to do this [Doctorow makes SOS motion] and I will slow down.

74.1 So, tonight's talk – wah, wah, waaah [Doctorow makes 'fail horn'
sound, apparently in response to audience making SOS motion; audience
laughs]] – tonight's talk is not a copyright talk. I do copyright
talks all the time; questions about culture and creativity are
interesting enough, but to be honest, I'm quite sick of them. If you
want to hear freelancer writers like me bang on about what's happening
to the way we earn our living, by all means, go and find one of the
many talks I've done on this subject on YouTube. But, tonight, I want
to talk about something more important – I want to talk about general
purpose computers.

Because general purpose computers are, in fact, astounding – so
astounding that our society is still struggling to come to grips with
them: to figure out what they're for, to figure out how to accommodate
them, and how to cope with them. Which, unfortunately, brings me back
to copyright.

133.8 Because the general shape of the copyright wars and the lessons
they can teach us about the upcoming fights over the destiny of the
general purpose computer are important. In the beginning, we had
packaged software, and the attendant industry, and we had sneakernet.
So, we had floppy disks in ziplock bags, or in cardboard boxes, hung
on pegs in shops, and sold like candy bars and magazines. And they
were eminently susceptible to duplication, and so they were duplicated
quickly, and widely, and this was to the great chagrin of people who
made and sold software.

172.6 Enter DRM 0.96. They started to introduce physical defects to
the disks or started to insist on other physical indicia which the
software could check for – dongles, hidden sectors, challenge/response
protocols that required that you had physical possession of large,
unwieldy manuals that were difficult to copy, and of course these
failed, for two reasons. First, they were commercially unpopular, of
course, because they reduced the usefulness of the software to the
legitimate purchasers, while leaving the people who took the software
without paying for it untouched. The legitimate purchasers resented
the non-functionality of their backups, they hated the loss of scarce
ports to the authentication dongles, and they resented the
inconvenience of having to transport large manuals when they wanted to
run their software. And second, these didn't stop pirates, who found
it trivial to patch the software and bypass authentication. Typically,
the way that happened is some expert who had possession of technology
and expertise of equivalent sophistication to the software vendor
itself, would reverse engineer the software and release cracked
versions that quickly became widely circulated. While this kind of
expertise and technology sounded highly specialized, it really wasn't;
figuring out what recalcitrant programs were doing, and routing around
the defects in shitty floppy disk media were both core skills for
computer programmers, and were even more so in the era of fragile
floppy disks and the rough-and-ready early days of software
development. Anti-copying strategies only became more fraught as
networks spread; once we had BBSes, online services, USENET
newsgroups, and mailing lists, the expertise of people who figured out
how to defeat these authentication systems could be packaged up in
software as little crack files, or, as the network capacity increased,
the cracked disk images or executables themselves could be spread on
their own.

296.4 Which gave us DRM 1.0. By 1996, it became clear to everyone in
the halls of power that there was something important about to happen.
We were about to have an information economy, whatever the hell that
was. They assumed it meant an economy where we bought and sold
information. Now, information technology makes things efficient, so
imagine the markets that an information economy would have. You could
buy a book for a day, you could sell the right to watch the movie for
one Euro, and then you could rent out the pause button at one penny
per second. You could sell movies for one price in one country, and
another price in another, and so on, and so on; the fantasies of those
days were a little like a boring science fiction adaptation of the Old
Testament book of Numbers, a kind of tedious enumeration of every
permutation of things people do with information and the ways we could
charge them for it.

355.5 But none of this would be possible unless we could control how
people use their computers and the files we transfer to them. After
all, it was well and good to talk about selling someone the 24 hour
right to a video, or the right to move music onto an iPod, but not the
right to move music from the iPod onto another device, but how the
Hell could you do that once you'd given them the file? In order to do
that, to make this work, you needed to figure out how to stop
computers from running certain programs and inspecting certain files
and processes. For example, you could encrypt the file, and then
require the user to run a program that only unlocked the file under
certain circumstances.

395.8 But as they say on the Internet, “now you have two problems”.
You also, now, have to stop the user from saving the file while it's
in the clear, and you have to stop the user from figuring out where
the unlocking program stores its keys, because if the user finds the
keys, she'll just decrypt the file and throw away that stupid player
app.

416.6 And now you have three problems [audience laughs], because now
you have to stop the users who figure out how to render the file in
the clear from sharing it with other users, and now you've got *four!*
problems, because now you have to stop the users who figure out how to
extract secrets from unlocking programs from telling other users how
to do it too, and now you've got *five!* problems, because now you
have to stop users who figure out how to extract secrets from
unlocking programs from telling other users what the secrets were!

442.0 That's a lot of problems. But by 1996, we had a solution. We had
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, passed by the United Nations World
Intellectual Property Organization, which created laws that made it
illegal to extract secrets from unlocking programs, and it created
laws that made it illegal to extract media cleartexts from the
unlocking programs while they were running, and it created laws that
made it illegal to tell people how to extract secrets from unlocking
programs, and created laws that made it illegal to host copyrighted
works and secrets and all with a handy streamlined process that let
you remove stuff from the Internet without having to screw around with
lawyers, and judges, and all that crap. And with that, illegal copying
ended forever [audience laughs very hard, applauds], the information
economy blossomed into a beautiful flower that brought prosperity to
the whole wide world; as they say on the aircraft carriers, “Mission
Accomplished”. [audience laughs]

511.0 Well, of course that's not how the story ends because pretty
much anyone who understood computers and networks understood that
while these laws would create more problems than they could possibly
solve; after all, these were laws that made it illegal to look inside
your computer when it was running certain programs, they made it
illegal to tell people what you found when you looked inside your
computer, they made it easy to censor material on the internet without
having to prove that anything wrong had happened; in short, they made
unrealistic demands on reality and reality did not oblige them. After
all, copying only got easier following the passage of these laws –
copying will only ever get easier! Here, 2011, this is as hard as
copying will get! Your grandchildren will turn to you around the
Christmas table and say “Tell me again, Grandpa, tell me again,
Grandma, about when it was hard to copy things in 2011, when you
couldn't get a drive the size of your fingernail that could hold every
song ever recorded, every movie ever made, every word ever spoken,
every picture ever taken, everything, and transfer it in such a short
period of time you didn't even notice it was doing it, tell us again
when it was so stupidly hard to copy things back in 2011”. And so,
reality asserted itself, and everyone had a good laugh over how funny
our misconceptions were when we entered the 21st century, and then a
lasting peace was reached with freedom and prosperity for all.
[audience chuckles]

593.5 Well, not really. Because, like the nursery rhyme lady who
swallows a spider to catch a fly, and has to swallow a bird to catch
the spider, and a cat to catch the bird, and so on, so must a
regulation that has broad general appeal but is disastrous in its
implementation beget a new regulation aimed at shoring up the failure
of the old one. Now, it's tempting to stop the story here and conclude
that the problem is that lawmakers are either clueless or evil, or
possibly evilly clueless, and just leave it there, which is not a very
satisfying place to go, because it's fundamentally a counsel of
despair; it suggests that our problems cannot be solved for so long as
stupidity and evilness are present in the halls of power, which is to
say they will never be solved. But I have another theory about what's
happened.

644.4 It's not that regulators don't understand information
technology, because it should be possible to be a non-expert and still
make a good law! M.P.s and Congressmen and so on are elected to
represent districts and people, not disciplines and issues. We don't
have a Member of Parliament for biochemistry, and we don't have a
Senator from the great state of urban planning, and we don't have an
M.E.P. from child welfare. (But perhaps we should.) And yet those
people who are experts in policy and politics, not technical
disciplines, nevertheless, often do manage to pass good rules that
make sense, and that's because government relies on heuristics – rules
of thumbs about how to balance expert input from different sides of an
issue.

686.3 But information technology confounds these heuristics – it kicks
the crap out of them – in one important way, and this is it. One
important test of whether or not a regulation is fit for a purpose is
first, of course, whether it will work, but second of all, whether or
not in the course of doing its work, it will have lots of effects on
everything else. If I wanted Congress to write, or Parliament to
write, or the E.U. to regulate a wheel, it's unlikely I'd succeed. If
I turned up and said “well, everyone knows that wheels are good and
right, but have you noticed that every single bank robber has four
wheels on his car when he drives away from the bank robbery? Can't we
do something about this?”, the answer would of course be “no”. Because
we don't know how to make a wheel that is still generally useful for
legitimate wheel applications but useless to bad guys. And we can all
see that the general benefits of wheels are so profound that we'd be
foolish to risk them in a foolish errand to stop bank robberies by
changing wheels. Even if there were an /epidemic/ of bank robberies,
even if society were on the verge of collapse thanks to bank
robberies, no-one would think that wheels were the right place to
start solving our problems.

762.0 But. If I were to show up in that same body to say that I had
absolute proof that hands-free phones were making cars dangerous, and
I said, “I would like you to pass a law that says it's illegal to put
a hands-free phone in a car”, the regulator might say “Yeah, I'd take
your point, we'd do that”. And we might disagree about whether or not
this is a good idea, or whether or not my evidence made sense, but
very few of us would say “well, once you take the hands-free phones
out of the car, they stop being cars”. We understand that we can keep
cars cars even if we remove features from them. Cars are special
purpose, at least in comparison to wheels, and all that the addition
of a hands-free phone does is add one more feature to an
already-specialized technology. In fact, there's that heuristic that
we can apply here – special-purpose technologies are complex. And you
can remove features from them without doing fundamental disfiguring
violence to their underlying utility.

816.5 This rule of thumb serves regulators well, by and large, but it
is rendered null and void by the general-purpose computer and the
general-purpose network – the PC and the Internet. Because if you
think of computer software as a feature, that is a computer with
spreadsheets running on it has a spreadsheet feature, and one that's
running World of Warcraft has an MMORPG feature, then this heuristic
leads you to think that you could reasonably say, “make me a computer
that doesn't run spreadsheets”, and that it would be no more of an
attack on computing than “make me a car without a hands-free phone” is
an attack on cars. And if you think of protocols and sites as features
of the network, then saying “fix the Internet so that it doesn't run
BitTorrent”, or “fix the Internet so that thepiratebay.org no longer
resolves”, then it sounds a lot like “change the sound of busy
signals”, or “take that pizzeria on the corner off the phone network”,
and not like an attack on the fundamental principles of
internetworking.

870.5 Not realizing that this rule of thumb that works for cars and
for houses and for every other substantial area of technological
regulation fails for the Internet does not make you evil and it does
not make you an ignoramus. It just makes you part of that vast
majority of the world for whom ideas like “Turing complete” and
“end-to-end” are meaningless. So, our regulators go off, and they
blithely pass these laws, and they become part of the reality of our
technological world. There are suddenly numbers that we aren't allowed
to write down on the Internet, programs we're not allowed to publish,
and all it takes to make legitimate material disappear from the
Internet is to say “that? That infringes copyright.” It fails to
attain the actual goal of the regulation; it doesn't stop people from
violating copyright, but it bears a kind of superficial resemblance to
copyright enforcement – it satisfies the security syllogism:
“something must be done, I am doing something, something has been
done.” And thus any failures that arise can be blamed on the idea that
the regulation doesn't go far enough, rather than the idea that it was
flawed from the outset.

931.2 This kind of superficial resemblance and underlying divergence
happens in other engineering contexts. I've a friend who was once a
senior executive at a big consumer packaged goods company who told me
about what happened when the marketing department told the engineers
that they'd thought up a great idea for detergent: from now on, they
were going to make detergent that made your clothes newer every time
you washed them! Well after the engineers had tried unsuccessfully to
convey the concept of “entropy” to the marketing department [audience
laughs], they arrived at another solution – “solution” – they'd
develop a detergent that used enzymes that attacked loose fiber ends,
the kind that you get with broken fibers that make your clothes look
old. So every time you washed your clothes in the detergent, they
would look newer. But that was because the detergent was literally
digesting your clothes! Using it would literally cause your clothes to
dissolve in the washing machine! This was the opposite of making
clothes newer; instead, you were artificially aging your clothes every
time you washed them, and as the user, the more you deployed the
“solution”, the more drastic your measures had to be to keep your
clothes up to date – you actually had to go buy new clothes because
the old ones fell apart.

1012.5 So today we have marketing departments who say things like “we
don't need computers, we need… appliances. Make me a computer that
doesn't run every program, just a program that does this specialized
task, like streaming audio, or routing packets, or playing Xbox games,
and make sure it doesn't run programs that I haven't authorized that
might undermine our profits”. And on the surface, this seems like a
reasonable idea – just a program that does one specialized task –
after all, we can put an electric motor in a blender, and we can
install a motor in a dishwasher, and we don't worry if it's still
possible to run a dishwashing program in a blender. But that's not
what we do when we turn a computer into an appliance. We're not making
a computer that runs only the “appliance” app; we're making a computer
that can run every program, but which uses some combination of
rootkits, spyware, and code-signing to prevent the user from knowing
which processes are running, from installing her own software, and
from terminating processes that she doesn't want. In other words, an
appliance is not a stripped-down computer – it is a fully functional
computer with spyware on it out of the box.

[audience applauds loudly] Thanks.

1090.5 Because we don't know how to build the general purpose computer
that is capable of running any program we can compile except for some
program that we don't like, or that we prohibit by law, or that loses
us money. The closest approximation that we have to this is a computer
with spyware – a computer on which remote parties set policies without
the computer user's knowledge, over the objection of the computer's
owner. And so it is that digital rights management always converges on
malware.

1118.9 There was, of course, this famous incident, a kind of gift to
people who have this hypothesis, in which Sony loaded covert rootkit
installers on 6 million audio CDs, which secretly executed programs
that watched for attempts to read the sound files on CDs, and
terminated them, and which also hid the rootkit's existence by causing
the kernel to lie about which processes were running, and which files
were present on the drive. But it's not the only example; just
recently, Nintendo shipped the 3DS, which opportunistically updates
its firmware, and does an integrity check to make sure that you
haven't altered the old firmware in any way, and if it detects signs
of tampering, it bricks itself.

1158.8 Human rights activists have raised alarms over U-EFI, the new
PC bootloader, which restricts your computer so it runs signed
operating systems, noting that repressive governments will likely
withhold signatures from OSes unless they have covert surveillance
operations.

1175.5 And on the network side, attempts to make a network that can't
be used for copyright infringement always converges with the
surveillance measures that we know from repressive governments. So,
SOPA, the U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act, bans tools like DNSSec because
they can be used to defeat DNS blocking measures. And it blocks tools
like Tor, because they can be used to circumvent IP blocking measures.
In fact, the proponents of SOPA, the Motion Picture Association of
America, circulated a memo, citing research that SOPA would probably
work, because it uses the same measures as are used in Syria, China,
and Uzbekistan, and they argued that these measures are effective in
those countries, and so they would work in America, too!

[audience laughs and applauds] Don't applaud me, applaud the MPAA!

1221.5 Now, it may seem like SOPA is the end game in a long fight over
copyright, and the Internet, and it may seem like if we defeat SOPA,
we'll be well on our way to securing the freedom of PCs and networks.
But as I said at the beginning of this talk, this isn't about
copyright, because the copyright wars are just the 0.9 beta version of
the long coming war on computation. The entertainment industry were
just the first belligerents in this coming century-long conflict. We
tend to think of them as particularly successful – after all, here is
SOPA, trembling on the verge of passage, and breaking the internet on
this fundamental level in the name of preserving Top 40 music, reality
TV shows, and Ashton Kutcher movies! [laughs, scattered applause]

1270.2 But the reality is, copyright legislation gets as far as it
does precisely because it's not taken seriously, which is why on one
hand, Canada has had Parliament after Parliament introduce one stupid
copyright bill after another, but on the other hand, Parliament after
Parliament has failed to actually vote on the bill. It's why we got
SOPA, a bill composed of pure stupid, pieced together
molecule-by-molecule, into a kind of “Stupidite 250”, which is
normally only found in the heart of newborn star, and it's why these
rushed-through SOPA hearings had to be adjourned midway through the
Christmas break, so that lawmakers could get into a real vicious
nationally-infamous debate over an important issue, unemployment
insurance. It's why the World Intellectual Property Organization is
gulled time and again into enacting crazed, pig-ignorant copyright
proposals because when the nations of the world send their U.N.
missions to Geneva, they send water experts, not copyright experts;
they send health experts, not copyright experts; they send agriculture
experts, not copyright experts, because copyright is just not
important to pretty much everyone! [applause]

1350.3 Canada's Parliament didn't vote on its copyright bills because,
of all the things that Canada needs to do, fixing copyright ranks well
below health emergencies on First Nations reservations, exploiting the
oil patch in Alberta, interceding in sectarian resentments among
French- and English-speakers, solving resources crises in the nation's
fisheries, and thousand other issues! The triviality of copyright
tells you that when other sectors of the economy start to evince
concerns about the Internet and the PC, that copyright will be
revealed for a minor skirmish, and not a war. Why would other sectors
nurse grudges against computers? Well, because the world we live in
today is /made/ of computers. We don't have cars anymore, we have
computers we ride in; we don't have airplanes anymore, we have flying
Solaris boxes with a big bucketful of SCADA controllers [laughter]; a
3D printer is not a device, it's a peripheral, and it only works
connected to a computer; a radio is no longer a crystal, it's a
general-purpose computer with a fast ADC and a fast DAC and some
software.

1418.9 The grievances that arose from unauthorized copying are
trivial, when compared to the calls for action that our new
computer-embroidered reality will create. Think of radio for a minute.
The entire basis for radio regulation up until today was based on the
idea that the properties of a radio are fixed at the time of
manufacture, and can't be easily altered. You can't just flip a switch
on your baby monitor, and turn it into something that interferes with
air traffic control signals. But powerful software-defined radios can
change from baby monitor to emergency services dispatcher to air
traffic controller just by loading and executing different software,
which is why the first time the American telecoms regulator (the FCC)
considered what would happen when we put SDRs in the field, they asked
for comment on whether it should mandate that all software-defined
radios should be embedded in trusted computing machines. Ultimately,
whether every PC should be locked, so that the programs they run are
strictly regulated by central authorities.

1477.9 And even this is a shadow of what is to come. After all, this
was the year in which we saw the debut of open sourced shape files for
converting AR-15s to full automatic. This was the year of crowd-funded
open-sourced hardware for gene sequencing. And while 3D printing will
give rise to plenty of trivial complaints, there will be judges in the
American South and Mullahs in Iran who will lose their *minds* over
people in their jurisdiction printing out sex toys. [guffaw from
audience] The trajectory of 3D printing will most certainly raise real
grievances, from solid state meth labs, to ceramic knives.

1516.0 And it doesn't take a science fiction writer to understand why
regulators might be nervous about the user-modifiable firmware on
self-driving cars, or limiting interoperability for aviation
controllers, or the kind of thing you could do with bio-scale
assemblers and sequencers. Imagine what will happen the day that
Monsanto determines that it's really… *really*… important to make sure
that computers can't execute programs that cause specialized
peripherals to output organisms that eat their lunch… literally.
Regardless of whether you think these are real problems or merely
hysterical fears, they are nevertheless the province of lobbies and
interest groups that are far more influential than Hollywood and big
content are on their best days, and every one of them will arrive at
the same place – “can't you just make us a general purpose computer
that runs all the programs, except the ones that scare and anger us?
Can't you just make us an Internet that transmits any message over any
protocol between any two points, unless it upsets us?”

1576.3 And personally, I can see that there will be programs that run
on general purpose computers and peripherals that will even freak me
out. So I can believe that people who advocate for limiting general
purpose computers will find receptive audience for their positions.
But just as we saw with the copyright wars, banning certain
instructions, or protocols, or messages, will be wholly ineffective as
a means of prevention and remedy; and as we saw in the copyright wars,
all attempts at controlling PCs will converge on rootkits; all
attempts at controlling the Internet will converge on surveillance and
censorship, which is why all this stuff matters. Because we've spent
the last 10+ years as a body sending our best players out to fight
what we thought was the final boss at the end of the game, but it
turns out it's just been the mini-boss at the end of the level, and
the stakes are only going to get higher.

1627.8 As a member of the Walkman generation, I have made peace with
the fact that I will require a hearing aid long before I die, and of
course, it won't be a hearing aid, it will be a computer I put in my
body. So when I get into a car – a computer I put my body into – with
my hearing aid – a computer I put inside my body – I want to know that
these technologies are not designed to keep secrets from me, and to
prevent me from terminating processes on them that work against my
interests. [vigorous applause from audience] Thank you.

1669.4 Thank you. So, last year, the Lower Merion School District, in
a middle-class, affluent suburb of Philadelphia found itself in a
great deal of trouble, because it was caught distributing PCs to its
students, equipped with rootkits that allowed for remote covert
surveillance through the computer's camera and network connection. It
transpired that they had been photographing students thousands of
times, at home and at school, awake and asleep, dressed and naked.
Meanwhile, the latest generation of lawful intercept technology can
covertly operate cameras, mics, and GPSes on PCs, tablets, and mobile
devices.

1705.0 Freedom in the future will require us to have the capacity to
monitor our devices and set meaningful policy on them, to examine and
terminate the processes that run on them, to maintain them as honest
servants to our will, and not as traitors and spies working for
criminals, thugs, and control freaks. And we haven't lost yet, but we
have to win the copyright wars to keep the Internet and the PC free
and open. Because these are the materiel in the wars that are to come,
we won't be able to fight on without them. And I know this sounds like
a counsel of despair, but as I said, these are early days. We have
been fighting the mini-boss, and that means that great challenges are
yet to come, but like all good level designers, fate has sent us a
soft target to train ourselves on – we have a organizations that fight
for them – EFF, Bits of Freedom, EDRi, CCC, Netzpolitik, La Quadrature
du Net, and all the others, who are thankfully, too numerous to name
here – we may yet win the battle, and secure the ammunition we'll need
for the war.

1778.9 Thank you.

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