On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:03 PM Morné Lamprecht wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 09:25:13AM -0400, Larry Brown wrote:
> >>> I wonder, if there are best practices, how to protect the data from
> >>> getting
> >>> corrupted (intentionally by an attacker or by accident through ... flash
> >>> cor
On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 09:25:13AM -0400, Larry Brown wrote:
I wonder, if there are best practices, how to protect the data from getting
corrupted (intentionally by an attacker or by accident through ... flash
corruption or whatever).
Ideally your hardware should have some sort of hw-based sec
You could either partition the flash with intentional space left at the end
of the disk and write/read directly to the flash at the specified location
or you could put it at the end of the uboot space. There is a chunk of
unused space at the end of the uboot image that is not used IIRC that
should
Hi Matthias,
an easier solution may be write those data during production. I don't think
that having a custom partition for each device is a good idea. You could
start the device in "production mode" and inject into the device specific
data through serial or USB. Obviously you must have some piece
Hi Morné,
thanks for you answer. Maybe, I will explain more: we have a Dragonboard
410c based hardware. We use a read-only rootfs in one partition
(actually two with A/B approach) and we have a data partition for user
data as well as device specific data. We can partition and flash the
device
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 05:25:56PM +0200, Matthias Schoepfer wrote:
Is there a smart, recommended way to deal with device specific data (i.e.
serial number, credentials for backend access, you name it), that is specific
for *one* device, and hence does not belong into the rootfs. I know, that t
Hi!
I have a general, maybe dumb question. Is there a smart, recommended way
to deal with device specific data (i.e. serial number, credentials for
backend access, you name it), that is specific for *one* device, and
hence does not belong into the rootfs. I know, that there are (safe)
hardwar
