RE: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with XEN_PX_INIT

2025-06-16 Thread Penny, Zheng
[Public] > -Original Message- > From: Jan Beulich > Sent: Monday, June 16, 2025 5:16 PM > To: Penny, Zheng > Cc: Huang, Ray ; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org > Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with > XEN_PX_INIT > > On 16.

Re: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with XEN_PX_INIT

2025-06-16 Thread Jan Beulich
On 16.06.2025 11:05, Penny, Zheng wrote: > [Public] > >> -Original Message- >> From: Jan Beulich >> Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2025 11:20 PM >> To: Penny, Zheng >> Cc: Huang, Ray ; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org >> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/18] x

RE: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with XEN_PX_INIT

2025-06-16 Thread Penny, Zheng
[Public] > -Original Message- > From: Jan Beulich > Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2025 11:20 PM > To: Penny, Zheng > Cc: Huang, Ray ; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org > Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with > XEN_PX_INIT > > On 27

Re: [PATCH v5 01/18] xen/pmstat: guard perf.states[] access with XEN_PX_INIT

2025-06-11 Thread Jan Beulich
On 27.05.2025 10:48, Penny Zheng wrote: > Accessing to perf.states[] array shall not be only guarded with user-defined > hypercall input, so we add XEN_PX_INIT check to gain safety. What is "guarded with user-defined hypercall input"? And what safety are we lacking? > --- a/xen/drivers/acpi/pmsta