On 06/03/2019 16:42, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.02.19 at 17:13, wrote:
>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
>> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is requi
>>> On 27.02.19 at 17:13, wrote:
> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
> that selected checks are
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound acc
Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-o
