Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH L1TF v9 2/7] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec

2019-02-28 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 27.02.19 at 17:13, wrote: > Since the L1TF vulnerability of Intel CPUs, loading hypervisor data into > L1 cache is problematic, because when hyperthreading is used as well, a > guest running on the sibling core can leak this potentially secret data. > > To prevent these speculative accesse

[Xen-devel] [PATCH L1TF v9 2/7] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec

2019-02-27 Thread Norbert Manthey
Since the L1TF vulnerability of Intel CPUs, loading hypervisor data into L1 cache is problematic, because when hyperthreading is used as well, a guest running on the sibling core can leak this potentially secret data. To prevent these speculative accesses, we block speculation after accessing the