Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

2021-09-10 Thread Juergen Gross
On 10.09.21 12:19, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 05:33:10PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: On 24.08.2021 12:28, Juergen Gross wrote: It should be mentioned that a similar series has been posted some years ago by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, but this series has not been app

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

2021-09-10 Thread Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 05:33:10PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 24.08.2021 12:28, Juergen Gross wrote: > > It should be mentioned that a similar series has been posted some years > > ago by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, but this series has not been applied > > due to a Xen header not having been av

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

2021-08-25 Thread patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
Hello: This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (refs/heads/master): On Tue, 24 Aug 2021 12:28:05 +0200 you wrote: > Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0 > user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might > reside in a less trusted environm

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

2021-08-24 Thread Jan Beulich
On 24.08.2021 12:28, Juergen Gross wrote: > It should be mentioned that a similar series has been posted some years > ago by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, but this series has not been applied > due to a Xen header not having been available in the Xen git repo at > that time. Additionally my series is

[PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

2021-08-24 Thread Juergen Gross
Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0 user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still mess up I/O data, but i