On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
wrote:
> There are a couple of problems for Xen PV guests that need to be addressed:
> 1. Xen's set_fixmap op needs non-default handling for
> FIX_GDT_REMAP_BEGIN range
> 2. GDT remapping for PV guests needs to be RO for both 64 and 32-bit guests.
On 03/09/2017 06:17 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 03/09/2017 05:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
>> wrote:
> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
> test it.
I am pretty sure I tested this series at so
On 03/09/2017 05:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
> wrote:
I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
test it.
>>> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>>>
>>
>> Fails 32-bi
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
wrote:
>
>>> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
>>> test it.
>>
>> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>>
>
>
> Fails 32-bit build:
>
>
> /home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86/k
>> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can test
>> it.
>
> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>
Fails 32-bit build:
/home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c: In function ‘segment_base’:
/home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86
On 03/09/2017 04:54 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper
>> wrote:
>>> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper
> wrote:
>> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>>
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct threa
On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t,
>>
>> *shadow = t->tls_array[i];
>>
>> -
On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt
> instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can
> be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an
> attacker could target other per-cpu
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