On Fri, Mar 6, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> If I had a technical solution to this problem I'd propose it but I don't,
> I'm just flagging it right now and hope we can come up with one.
Shortly I'll be posting part of a proactive solution I believe we
could consider for these sorts
On Fri, Mar 06, 2015 at 11:02:50AM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 04, 2015 at 05:47:03PM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin
> > wrote:
> > > On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > >> If it is like that - then ju
On Wed, Mar 04, 2015 at 05:47:03PM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin
> wrote:
> > On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> >> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
> >> for the stack protection as a template o
On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
>> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
>> work?
>
> Probably. I think I could make this work
On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>> On 04.03.15 at 05:53, wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 08:20 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 2:06 AM, David Vrabel wrote:
>>> On 03/03/15 09:40, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
Now Xen should not have SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP but PVOPs' goal is to
On 03/03/2015 08:20 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 2:06 AM, David Vrabel wrote:
On 03/03/15 09:40, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
Andrey,
I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
Why? This is the first of heard of this.
Andrey chimed in here c
On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 2:06 AM, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 03/03/15 09:40, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>> Andrey,
>>
>> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>
> Why? This is the first of heard of this.
Andrey chimed in here confirming this.
>> from someone on xen-de
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> >> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> >>> Andrey,
> >>>
> >>> I believe that on Xen we shoul
On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>> Andrey,
>>>
>>> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>>
>> I guess Xen guests won't work
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > Andrey,
> >
> > I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>
> I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup
> shadow
>
On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Andrey,
>
> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
(kasan_map_early_shadow() is not called in xen guests).
Disabling kasan for Xen i
>>> On 03.03.15 at 10:40, wrote:
> Let's go down the rabbit hole for a bit. HAVE_ARCH_KASAN will be
> selected on x86 when:
>
> if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
>
> Now Xen should not have SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
Why would that be?
Jan
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On 03/03/15 09:40, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Andrey,
>
> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
Why? This is the first of heard of this.
> from someone on xen-devel though. Here's the thing though -- if true
> -- I'd like to do it *properly*, where *properly* me
Andrey,
I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
from someone on xen-devel though. Here's the thing though -- if true
-- I'd like to do it *properly*, where *properly* means addressing a
bit of architecture. A simple Kconfig slap seems rather reactive. I'd
like to add
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