On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
wrote:
> There are a couple of problems for Xen PV guests that need to be addressed:
> 1. Xen's set_fixmap op needs non-default handling for
> FIX_GDT_REMAP_BEGIN range
> 2. GDT remapping for PV guests needs to be RO for both 64 and 32-bit guests.
On 03/09/2017 06:17 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 03/09/2017 05:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
>> wrote:
> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
> test it.
I am pretty sure I tested this series at so
On 03/09/2017 05:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
> wrote:
I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
test it.
>>> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>>>
>>
>> Fails 32-bi
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Boris Ostrovsky
wrote:
>
>>> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can
>>> test it.
>>
>> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>>
>
>
> Fails 32-bit build:
>
>
> /home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86/k
>> I don't have any experience with Xen so it would be great if virtme can test
>> it.
>
> I am pretty sure I tested this series at some point but I'll test it again.
>
Fails 32-bit build:
/home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c: In function ‘segment_base’:
/home/build/linux-boris/arch/x86
On 03/09/2017 04:54 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper
>> wrote:
>>> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper
> wrote:
>> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>>
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>
On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct threa
On 09/03/2017 21:32, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t,
>>
>> *shadow = t->tls_array[i];
>>
>> -
On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt
> instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can
> be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an
> attacker could target other per-cpu
Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt
instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can
be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an
attacker could target other per-cpu structures or deduce the base of
the main memory section (PAGE
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