>>> On 07.07.15 at 18:20, wrote:
> On 07/07/2015 06:40 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 07.07.15 at 17:32, wrote:
>>> On 07/07/2015 04:27 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 06.07.15 at 17:51, wrote:
> @@ -1552,9 +1556,15 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned
> long gla,
>>>
On 07/07/2015 06:40 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 07.07.15 at 17:32, wrote:
>> On 07/07/2015 04:27 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 06.07.15 at 17:51, wrote:
@@ -1552,9 +1556,15 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned
long gla,
if ( v->arch.vm_event.emula
>>> On 07.07.15 at 17:32, wrote:
> On 07/07/2015 04:27 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 06.07.15 at 17:51, wrote:
>>> @@ -1552,9 +1556,15 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned
>>> long gla,
>>>
>>> if ( v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags )
>>> {
>>> -hvm_mem_access_
On 07/07/2015 04:27 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 06.07.15 at 17:51, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>> @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu_struct(void)
>>
>> void free_vcpu_struct(struct vcpu *v)
>> {
>> +xfree(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data)
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 9:21 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
wrote:
> On 07/07/2015 04:15 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> > mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
> >
> > So VM_EVENT_FLAG_FOREIGN (1 << 1), and then MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE (1 <<
> 6).
>
>>> On 06.07.15 at 17:51, wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu_struct(void)
>
> void free_vcpu_struct(struct vcpu *v)
> {
> +xfree(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data);
> free_xenheap_page(v);
> }
Please note th
On 07/07/2015 04:15 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> So VM_EVENT_FLAG_FOREIGN (1 << 1), and then MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE (1 << 6).
> Now you're adding VM_EVENT_FLAG_TOGGLE_SINGLESTEP (1 << 2), and i
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
wrote:
> On 07/07/2015 03:04 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> > mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
> >
> > On 07/06/2015 09:30 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> > > If you'd prefer
On 07/07/2015 03:04 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> On 07/06/2015 09:30 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> > If you'd prefer that I do some ground work for the future
> (i.e. rename
> >
On 07/07/2015 03:04 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> On 07/06/2015 09:30 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> > If you'd prefer that I do some ground work for the future
> (i.e. rename
> >
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
wrote:
> On 07/06/2015 09:30 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> > If you'd prefer that I do some ground work for the future (i.e.
> rename
> > MEM_ACCESS constants, etc.), please let me know.
> >
> >
> > Yeap, that sounds reasonable to me.
>
> Any
On 07/06/2015 04:51 PM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> This patch adds support for memory-content hiding, by modifying the
> value returned by emulated instructions that read certain memory
> addresses that contain sensitive data. The patch only applies to
> cases where MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE or MEM_ACCESS_E
On 07/06/2015 09:30 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> If you'd prefer that I do some ground work for the future (i.e. rename
> MEM_ACCESS constants, etc.), please let me know.
>
>
> Yeap, that sounds reasonable to me.
Any objections to this renaming?
151 #define MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE
>
> If you'd prefer that I do some ground work for the future (i.e. rename
> MEM_ACCESS constants, etc.), please let me know.
Yeap, that sounds reasonable to me.
Thanks,
Tamas
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On 07/06/2015 07:50 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
> Handy feature, thanks for doing it!
You're very welcome, I'm quite happy you find it useful.
> @@ -1466,6 +1466,10 @@ void p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu *v,
> }
>
> v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = violation
Handy feature, thanks for doing it!
@@ -1466,6 +1466,10 @@ void p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu *v,
> }
>
> v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = violation ? rsp->flags : 0;
> +
> +if ( rsp->flags & MEM_ACCESS_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA &&
>
So one of the use-cases for this
This patch adds support for memory-content hiding, by modifying the
value returned by emulated instructions that read certain memory
addresses that contain sensitive data. The patch only applies to
cases where MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE or MEM_ACCESS_EMULATE_NOWRITE have
been set to a vm_event response.
S
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