> -Original Message-
> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:jbeul...@suse.com]
> Sent: 09 February 2017 14:43
> To: Paul Durrant
> Cc: xen-de...@lists.xenproject.org; Boris Ostrovsky
> ; Juergen Gross ; linux-
> ker...@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PAT
>>> On 09.02.17 at 15:17, wrote:
> @@ -666,6 +680,20 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
> +{
> + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
> + domid_t dom;
> +
The purpose if this ioctl is to allow a user of privcmd to restrict its
operation such that it will no longer service arbitrary hypercalls via
IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL, and will check for a matching domid when
servicing IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP. The aim of this is to limit the attack
surface for a compro
