On Tue, 21 Mar 2017 12:04:02 +
Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 10/03/17 15:50, Vlad Ioan Topan wrote:
> > Adds monitor support for descriptor access events (reads & writes of
> > IDTR/GDTR/LDTR/TR) for the x86 architecture (VMX and SVM).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vlad
_cmt_op_t);
> > #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID 6
> > #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_PRIVILEGED_CALL 7
> > #define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT 8
> > +#define XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DESC_ACCESS 9
>
> ... the
On Tue, 14 Mar 2017 09:15:04 -0400
Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>
>
> On 03/14/2017 08:50 AM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> > On 03/14/2017 02:15 PM, Vlad-Ioan TOPAN wrote:
> >>>> @@ -2642,6 +2660,38 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs
> >>
shorter and still
keep it readable, which in my opinion would be bad. Although they will
most likely stay sequential and keep their current numeric values, it's
not something I'd hardcode. Without those assumptions, it's either
another switch or a very long if, which would mean roughly the same
amount of code, but less readable (it's the way I've written it
initally before coming to this version).
--
Vlad-Ioan TOPAN
Linux Kernel Development Lead
Bitdefender
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d exit_qualification, while the svm would only
> have svm_exitinfo.
Makes sense, will do.
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Vlad-Ioan TOPAN
Linux Kernel Development Lead
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Adds monitor support for descriptor access events (reads & writes of
IDTR/GDTR/LDTR/TR) for the x86 architecture (VMX and SVM).
Signed-off-by: Vlad Ioan Topan
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 2 ++
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c| 14 +++
tools/tests/xen-access
ot; parameter (up until the ept_set_entry() call,
which gets sve as "current->domain != d" from
p2m_set_altp2m_mem_access()). At that level a separate parameter for
sVE does not make sense, since the code is shared with the ARM arch.
Would it be acceptable to add
bit in PTEs? Unsuppressing #VEs for a page
will only do anything if the guest has already enabled #VE, so the
previous issue doesn't apply in this case.
Thank you for the prompt answer!
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nt->domain != d));
The "(current->domain != d)" bit there is the sve parameter.
Is there any reason not to allow cross-domain enabling of #VE?
Thank you,
--
Vlad-Ioan TOPAN
Linux Kernel Development Lead
Bitdefender
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