On Sat, May 17, 2008 at 04:28:03PM +1000, Rusty Russell wrote:
>
> But you did not address the DoS question: can we ignore it? Or are we
> trading
> off a DoS in the host against a potential security weakness in the guest?
Why not do both? Use the host's urandom to make the guest at least
unpre
On Saturday 17 May 2008 14:50:31 H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> Rusty Russell wrote:
> > On Friday 16 May 2008 20:49:41 Johannes Berg wrote:
> >>> +
> >>> +/* Our random number generator device reads from /dev/urandom into the
> >>> Guest's + * input buffers. The usual case is that the Guest doesn't
> >>
Rusty Russell wrote:
> On Friday 16 May 2008 20:49:41 Johannes Berg wrote:
>>> +
>>> +/* Our random number generator device reads from /dev/urandom into the
>>> Guest's
>>> + * input buffers. The usual case is that the Guest doesn't want random
>>> numbers
>>> + * and so has no buffers although
On Friday 16 May 2008 20:49:41 Johannes Berg wrote:
> > +
> > +/* Our random number generator device reads from /dev/urandom into the
> > Guest's
> > + * input buffers. The usual case is that the Guest doesn't want random
> > numbers
> > + * and so has no buffers although /dev/urandom is still r
On Friday 16 May 2008 19:28:27 Tomasz Chmielewski wrote:
> Christian Borntraeger schrieb:
> > Hello Rusty,
> >
> > sometimes it is useful to share a disk (e.g. usr). To avoid file system
> > corruption, the disk should be mounted read-only in that case.
>
> Although it is done at a different level
I started looking at this patch set.
Parts 1-9 applied ok, but part10 (entry.S) failed to apply because of
recent changes to this file to fix the problems with warnings when
trying to get locks with interrupts blocked.
I thought this would be a good point to test the bisectability
of this patch s
Johannes Berg wrote:
>> +
>> +/* Our random number generator device reads from /dev/urandom into the
>> Guest's
>> + * input buffers. The usual case is that the Guest doesn't want random
>> numbers
>> + * and so has no buffers although /dev/urandom is still readable, whereas
>> + * console is th
On Friday 16 May 2008 19:17:03 Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> Hello Rusty,
>
> sometimes it is useful to share a disk (e.g. usr). To avoid file system
> corruption, the disk should be mounted read-only in that case. This patch
> adds a new feature flag, that allows the host to specify, if the disk
Hello Rusty,
sometimes it is useful to share a disk (e.g. usr). To avoid file system
corruption, the disk should be mounted read-only in that case. This patch
adds a new feature flag, that allows the host to specify, if the disk should
be considered read-only.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntrae
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig |4 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile |1 +
arch/x86/kernel/pvclock.c | 148 +
include/asm-x86/pvclock.h |6 ++
4 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
cre
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig |1 +
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 86 ---
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index deb3049..b749c85 1006
paravirt clock source patches, next round, with a bunch of changes
in the host code according to Avi's review comments and some minor
code tweaks.
cheers,
Gerd
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Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
arch/x86/xen/Kconfig |1 +
arch/x86/xen/time.c | 110 +-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
index 2e641be..3a4f16a 1
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 71 ---
include/asm-x86/kvm_host.h |1 +
2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index dab3d4f..7f84467
Avi Kivity wrote:
>> +struct timespec now,sys,boot;
>
> Add spaces.
Done.
>> +#if 0
>> +/* Hmm, getboottime() isn't exported to modules ... */
>> +getboottime(&boot);
>> +#else
>> +now = current_kernel_time();
>> +ktime_get_ts(&sys);
>> +boot = ns_to_timespec(timespec_to_
Am Freitag, 16. Mai 2008 schrieb Rusty Russell:
> virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.
>
> Note that by itself, having a "hardware" random generator does very
> little: you should probably run "rngd" in your guest to feed this into
> the kernel entropy pool.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rusty Ru
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