Re: [Uta] New proposal: SMTP Strict Transport Security

2016-04-11 Thread David Schweikert
Hi Viktor, On Sun, Apr 10, 2016 at 20:36:42 +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > OK, got it. But this is going to work only for nexthops / relays > > specified as a mail domain (and not as hosts), right? > > Either. For example, DANE works regardless of whether routing is > via MX records or direct

Re: [Uta] New proposal: SMTP Strict Transport Security

2016-04-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 10:07:14AM +0200, Daniel Margolis wrote: > I see your point. But I think one thing still needs to be specified. In the > smarthost case, what domain is used to validate the server certificate > during the HTTPS policy fetch? The nexthop domain. It may, or may not, be subj

[Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence

2016-04-11 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, With no hats, I'd like to argue that the WG should pursue the "webby" STS proposal, but should also ensure that we do not damage progress made by those who are deploying the DANE/DNSSEC approach to securing MTA-MTA connections. I think we can do that by requiring that outbound MTAs that im

Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence

2016-04-11 Thread Jim Fenton
On 4/11/16 1:45 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > - We can, and probably will, define a "webby" to achieve > the same desired effect of getting beyond opportunistic > security. Daniel and co's STS aprooach (as outlined for > the next revision in B-A) is one such, and seems like > it's one that c

Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence

2016-04-11 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 09:45:06PM +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > With no hats, I'd like to argue that the WG should pursue > the "webby" STS proposal, but should also ensure that we > do not damage progress made by those who are deploying the > DANE/DNSSEC approach to securing MTA-MTA connection