Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread John Wilcock
Le 03/05/2020 à 05:27, Grant Taylor a écrit : On 5/2/20 1:47 PM, Loren Wilton wrote: The compromised password is already in plain text in the subject of the message; there isn't much point in hiding it other than embarassment. What if the email server with the list of plain text passwords is

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 6:16 AM, John Wilcock wrote: In the context of a list of passwords known to be compromised, it is hopefully fair to assume that they are no longer in current use, and thus no longer of any importance. If it isn't fair to assume that, then the organisation has bigger issues in any case

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 10:09 AM, Jeff Mincy wrote: The best practice is to not use common or continue to use exposed passwords. Scripts are probably trying to log into your ssh using those passwords. I completely agree on both accounts. I think you are worrying about the wrong thing. I obviously disagre

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Martin Gregorie
On Mon, 2020-05-04 at 13:03 -0600, Grant Taylor wrote: > Which is why I have not. It's also why I asked if there was a way to > compare hashed text. To quote: > > "Is there any way to compare hashed strings of text?" > > I'll note that my question hasn't been answered. Instead, people > have

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread John Hardin
On Mon, 4 May 2020, Grant Taylor wrote: On 5/4/20 10:09 AM, Jeff Mincy wrote: If you are no longer using the exposed password then disclosing the previously used password further is not going to make any difference. I disagree. Storing any plain text passwords is a bad practice and should b

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 2:06 PM, Martin Gregorie wrote: Encrypt them and put them in a single column database table that's also the prime key for the table? Lookup by encrypting the item being checked before looking for an SQL hit count: select count(*) where log.key = key; 0=miss, 1=hit, 2+ = error. Sho

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Martin Gregorie
On Mon, 2020-05-04 at 15:14 -0600, Grant Taylor wrote: > I see little benefit of an SQL database vs rules with the encrypted > (hashed) passwords (possibly salted with the usernames / email > address) > in the SpamAssassin config file. Well, save for possible ease of > administration in that SA

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 2:51 PM, John Hardin wrote: *if* they are being actively used for authentication, either by the security system (which is a glaring flaw in the design of the security system) or as a reference for accessing the secured resource (e.g. a plaintext passwords file on your desktop, which i

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 3:09 PM, Jeff Mincy wrote: You will have to write a perl plugin for SpamAssassin that finds passwords in an email message and MD5 hashes those passwords and compares against a list of previously saved hashed passwords. The list of passwords could be stored in various ways. ACK Id

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Grant Taylor
On 5/4/20 3:59 PM, Martin Gregorie wrote: The list of such passwords might get rather long, so using a database both makes maintenance easier, as you spotted, and also keeps a lot of junk out of the rule sets. I absolutely agree. I like the idea of keeping data outside of configuration files.

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread Martin Gregorie
On Mon, 2020-05-04 at 16:25 -0600, Grant Taylor wrote: > I think $DatabaseTechnology's main benefit is keeping the password > data outside of the configuration files. > Agreed, in this sort of corner case. > select count(*) where log.key = md5(key); > Neat. > You can move the md5 generation

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread John Hardin
On Mon, 4 May 2020, Grant Taylor wrote: On 5/4/20 2:51 PM, John Hardin wrote: *if* they are being actively used for authentication, either by the security system (which is a glaring flaw in the design of the security system) or as a reference for accessing the secured resource (e.g. a plainte

Re: another extortion email check

2020-05-04 Thread John Hardin
On Tue, 5 May 2020, Martin Gregorie wrote: On Mon, 2020-05-04 at 16:25 -0600, Grant Taylor wrote: I think $DatabaseTechnology's main benefit is keeping the password data outside of the configuration files. Agreed, in this sort of corner case. select count(*) where log.key = md5(key);

Re: Question about the 'URIBL_BLOCKED' rule

2020-05-04 Thread Tom
On 5/3/20 1:16 AM, Bill Cole wrote: > On 30 Apr 2020, at 14:59, Tom Williams wrote: > >> Hi!  I'm new to this mailing list, but not new to SpamAssassin. I've >> used it on and off for a number years.  :)   Recently, (within the >> past 6 months or so) I enabled it for email in a shared web hosting