MUf> This was the point. If the line that should be matched with the rule is the
MUf> first one, AND the check is done before MTA adds Received: line (which is
MUf> case when the milter is used), this is an issue of the intermediate program
MUf> that feeds mail to spamassassin.
MUf> Now, Rainer,
MUf> This was the point. If the line that should be matched with the rule is the
MUf> first one, AND the check is done before MTA adds Received: line (which is
MUf> case when the milter is used), this is an issue of the intermediate program
MUf> that feeds mail to spamassassin.
MUf> Now, Rainer,
Am 07.02.2014 07:09, schrieb Axb:
On 02/07/2014 03:04 AM, Kevin A. McGrail wrote:
On 2/6/2014 8:32 PM, Dave Warren wrote:
On 2014-02-06 17:17, John Hardin wrote:
On Thu, 6 Feb 2014, Kevin A. McGrail wrote:
I've discussed it with Alex a bit but one of my next ideas for the
Rules QA process is
On Feb 7, 2014, at 6:08 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
> On 2014-02-07 01:33, Noel Butler wrote:
>> else we'd have seen a url in one of his posts
>> advertising it, therefore can be considered UCE
>
> agree if its free to download its not spam, i just think its the grey zone
> here
Sorry, no. The
On 2014-02-07 01:33, Noel Butler wrote:
else we'd have seen a url in one of his posts
advertising it, therefore can be considered UCE
agree if its free to download its not spam, i just think its the grey
zone here
On 2014-02-06 23:41, Marc Perkel wrote:
I have 700,000 IP addresses of hackers trying to send email using
stolen authentication. Anyone interested?
http://ipadmin.junkemailfilter.com/auth-hack.txt
q: how many is listed in spamhaus pbl ?
q: is dnswl filtered out ?
or is the list just auth fool
header MY_AUTH ALL =~ /\(authenticated
bits=\d+\)\s+by\s+myserver.mydomain.at/
On 31.01.14 16:58, Rainer Fügenstein wrote:
thanks. looks plausible, but doesn't work, unfortunately. I figured out
that rules matching the first line work, but rules for lines 2+ never
match, regardless of \n \s et
On 02/07/2014 09:03 AM, Olivier Nicole wrote:
I was considering, instead of plainly dropping the phishing
emails, why not deceiving it: having automatic replys with
invalid informations.
I guess that people who launch phishing campaings get few
answers, but the answers they get are correct, the
> > I was considering, instead of plainly dropping the phishing emails, why
> > not deceiving it: having automatic replys with invalid informations.
> >
> > I guess that people who launch phishing campaings get few answers, but
> > the answers they get are correct, the username and password match.