[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2020-06-22 Thread Samuele Pedroni
** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Status: Fix Committed => Fix Released -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd in trusty To manage notifications about this bug

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2018-06-07 Thread Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre
Setting this to Fix Committed. There has been feedback from the Security team, feedback was addressed, and it seems that in any case bundling of Go dependencies in trusty is more or less "unavoidable". MIR team ACK on promoting snapd to main in trusty. ** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Status

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2018-05-07 Thread Zygmunt Krynicki
Is there more action needed on this bug or can it be closed now? -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd in trusty To manage notifications about this bug go to: htt

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-05-19 Thread Tyler Hicks
Moving this back to New since mvo has addressed all feedback. ** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Status: Incomplete => New -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-04-27 Thread Emily Ratliff
** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Assignee: Ubuntu Security Team (ubuntu-security) => (unassigned) -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd in trusty To manage noti

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-04-05 Thread Michael Vogt
Yes, I can confirm that the snapd upstream developer will be responsive in fixing security issues and we have experience in preparing SRUs for trusty (and the other releases of Ubuntu). -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. h

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-03-24 Thread Tyler Hicks
In general, the Ubuntu Security team is ok with snapd going into main in 14.04. We trust that the snapd upstream developers will be responsive in fixing security issues and there's a documented history of them performing SRUs to stable Ubuntu releases. We can depend on them to prepare any necessar

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-02-07 Thread Tyler Hicks
** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Assignee: Michael Vogt (mvo) => Ubuntu Security Team (ubuntu-security) -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd in trusty To manag

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-02-01 Thread Thomas Voß
@Seth: We are deploying a deputy or subordinate systemd not running as PID 1 on trusty to support snapd. We isolated systemd on trusty away and minimized its interaction with the system, except for the functionality required by snapd. That is, upstart is still PID 1 and responsible for all system s

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-02-01 Thread Tyler Hicks
** Changed in: snapd (Ubuntu) Assignee: Ubuntu Security Team (ubuntu-security) => Michael Vogt (mvo) -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1660550 Title: [MIR] snapd in trusty To manag

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-01-31 Thread Seth Arnold
How are we going to handle snapd's use of systemd on trusty? Are we teaching snapd how to drive upstart? What portions of snap's security story are provided by systemd? How much work has been done to teach upstart suitable replacements? Are we backporting systemd to trusty and untangling upstart

[Bug 1660550] Re: [MIR] snapd in trusty

2017-01-31 Thread Michael Terry
Oh yeah this is a weird situation. :) I guess it would normally make sense to re-review if the potentially older code was different than what was previously approved. In this case, the code is the same as the newer releases? So I normally would expect a MIR rubber stamp. BUT... the MIR team i