Javier, all --
The assertion that science only concerns about beliefs, not about
actions, may be true for basic science, but not for applied science.
Would you say that decision analysis or any of its branches (for
instance, medical decision making) is not science?
I agree with you that applied sc
Peter McBURNEY wrote:
Surely a fundamental difference between scientific argument and legal
argument is that the former concerns argument over beliefs, about what
is true of the world, while the latter is argument over actions, about
what to do in some situation. Any rational consideration abo
07 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'UAI'
Subject: Re: [UAI] The concept of cointensive precisiation
Peter, all --
Peter Tillers wrote:
>Nonetheless, there is not a complete or radical separation between
the kind
>of legal argument that one sees in the courtroom and the kind
Peter, all --
Peter Tillers wrote:
Nonetheless, there is not a complete or radical separation between the kind
of legal argument that one sees in the courtroom and the kind of "argument"
that a scientist engages in when she attempts, say, to determine the cause
or causes of some disease. Logic
In their constructive and thought-provoking comments on the concept of
cointensive precisiation (uai digest, Vol 4, Issue 4), Professor Peter Tillers
and Tod Levitt point to an issue which has a position of centrality in natural
language understanding--the issue of context-dependence of meaning.
The message which follows is unconventional for UAI. It is intended
to draw attention of the UAI community to a concept which may shed some
light on why there are so many basic concepts for which operational
definitions do not exist. Among such concepts are those of causality,
relevance, summary
