Re: [tor-talk] Operating system updates / software installation behind Tor Transparent Proxy

Tails developers to audit Transmission, or possibly a client written in a "safer" language - better avoid duplicating the effort. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/

Re: [tor-talk] irc clients and Tor

Robert Ransom wrote (20 Feb 2012 08:23:05 GMT) : > torsocks 1.2-3 just hit wheezy/testing, and it works on irssi (at > least as shipped in wheezy). torsocks 1.2-3~bpo60+1 is now available in squeeze-backports. ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.tor

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

I've also written another tool, tlsdate[1], that > I regularly use for setting my own clock. What network fingerprint does tlsdate currently display if I run it in the clear, without forwarding its traffic through Tor? Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.or

Re: [tor-talk] Designing a secure "Tor box" for safe web browsing?

Hi, Maxim Kammerer wrote (22 Mar 2012 14:07:25 GMT) : > I implemented that approach once for the purpose of running unsafe > browser (https://github.com/mkdesu/liberte/commit/0f0646e), > executing an already-running image inside a nested QEMU. It's a nice > exercise, but too demanding on resources

Re: [tor-talk] How can the video play in TBB without plagins?

s means one has to click the object (this time a video) and answer > the dialog of NoScript. I think this may be what this ticket is about: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5266 Regards, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrige

Re: [tor-talk] obfsproxy

y.html Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/c

Re: [tor-talk] Designing a secure "Tor box" for safe web browsing?

ts of this idea. Maxim Kammerer wrote (26 Mar 2012 16:12:41 GMT) : > On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 00:52, intrigeri wrote: >> I'm curious about what resources proved to be limiting during your >> experiments, and what "too demanding" means in your usecases. > Well, Intel

Re: [tor-talk] Designing a secure "Tor box" for safe web browsing?

ctual content, but instead its linkage to particular physical locations or hardware. In this case, finding out the computer's MAC / IP addresses is not the least of their problems. I hope this clarifies things a bit. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.

Re: [tor-talk] Creating distributed social networks with WebId behind Tor

miniBill wrote (15 May 2012 19:25:46 GMT) : > 4) this requires every user to have an always on machine Julien Voisin is going to work on Tails server during GSoC this year; the task page was not updated -yet- with all the deeper thought that was put in the project since then, but you'll get the id

Re: [tor-talk] Pirate Linux 1.5

Hi, Andrew K wrote (31 May 2012 19:07:54 GMT) : > - Convenient access from the boot menu to the Tails Amnesic Incognito > Live System (This method of using Tails is not officially supported > by the Tails developers, and some features such as the USB installer > may not work). It always feels goo

Re: [tor-talk] Pirate Linux 1.5

Hi, AK wrote (31 May 2012 14:00:17 GMT) : > From what I tested, no security feature is broken. Great. > It's meant to easily allow people to try Tails, an if they like it > and they want the official version, they can go to the Tails website > and download the latest ISO. Was it your answer to

Re: [tor-talk] Pirate Linux 1.5

hi, AK wrote (31 May 2012 15:36:27 GMT) : >> Was it your answer to my question about upgrading Tails? > [...] > If someone is using Tails booted from Pirate Linux, they can > download the ISO from the Tails website, and use the USB installer > there, it should work as long as they have enough RAM

Re: [tor-talk] TorBirdy 0.0.10 released - testing and feedback requested!

Ethan Lee Vita wrote (12 Jul 2012 20:23:38 GMT) : > I agree, but what about the email client for Tails? > Will Thunderbird/TorBirdy be available in Tails in the future? > Or a way to torify that client? Please see https://tails.boum.org/todo/Return_of_Icedove__63__/ In case you want to follow-up

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

Hi, intrigeri wrote (25 Mar 2012 23:02:55 GMT) : > Jacob Appelbaum wrote (20 Feb 2012 20:30:08 GMT) : >> For a while I've been interested in secure network time that would >> be useful for Tor users. Tor users generally need accuracy to the >> hour in the local syst

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

like we'll need to think a bit more what kind of fingerprinting resistance a system like Tails can reasonably pretend to at this scale. (I'm re-adding the Cc to tails-dev, that was lost at some point. Please don't drop it again.) Cheers! -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ htt

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

about the rest later. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https:/

Re: [tor-talk] TBB lags behind as Firefox ESR 10.0.6 is released

Hi, Roger Dingledine wrote (21 Jul 2012 15:54:22 GMT) : > the Tails people set up a forum, and I hear they hate it so much > that at this point they wish they had nothing rather than the one > they have. Well, not exactly, else we would just shut it down immediately :) But yeah, our current foru

Re: [tor-talk] Tor on Raspberry Pi

Hi, || ΣΖΟ || wrote (21 Jul 2012 18:28:14 GMT) : > PiTails? On the Tails side, we have decided to wait a bit for the dust to settle, and for our upstreams (Linux, Debian, Debian Live) to support embedded and ARM platforms better, before we even try supporting this kind of hardware. Our efforts (

Re: [tor-talk] Tails' htpdate [Was: secure and simple network time (hack)]

7;m happy to take a patch :) ... but we need to make up our mind wrt. tlsdate first, I think. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc _

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] tails_htp: exit node can fingerprint Tails users until exit node is changed

Hi, adrelanos wrote (23 Jul 2012 01:36:26 GMT) : > Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over > Tor, the exit node can see "Hello, this is a Tails user!". (Who else > uses tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node > is changed. To be on the safe side, I

Re: [tor-talk] TAILS server?

ers, -- intrigeri ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] [tails] Crypto enforcement proposal

channels documented there: https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/input/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tor-tal

Re: [tor-talk] Tails question: Desktop in laptop mode during shutdown, mysterious sense data?

by following our bug reporting guidelines, that will lead you report your problem in a way that enables us to help: https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/bug_reporting/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaff

[tor-talk] Please review Tails stream isolation plans

many Tails users, and I guess these options were not added in order not to be used, but still.) Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/ot

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] Please review Tails stream isolation plans

textual identities at the same time, while we don't. > I initially proposed the feature for Tails Well, I think Jacob did (in 2011). > and now I am considering your improvements for aos. Nice! I'm glad this may be useful for aos :) Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ ht

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] Please review Tails stream isolation plans

Hi, Nick Mathewson wrote (29 Aug 2012 13:22:36 GMT) : > I'd need an actual list of applications to think about > IsolateDestAddr. Which ones did you have in mind? Thank you for having a look. The main network applications shipped in Tails, that would get IsolateDestAddr according to our plan, a

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] Please review Tails stream isolation plans

ce. It makes me uncomfortable to > see "and here goes an HTTP proxy" in any Tor design these days. Sure. Instead of investing time to move to Privoxy, we might as well want to simply drop Polipo. I've updated our ticket on this topic accordingly: https://tails.boum.org/todo/replac

Re: [tor-talk] Review request: TorVM implementation in Qubes OS

Hi, adrelanos wrote (16 Oct 2012 18:28:19 GMT) : > Abel Luck: >> I need to do more research into what it would take to protect the >> localtime. For example, what are the consequences (technically and >> UX-wise) of changing the local timezone to, presumably, UTC? > UTC is fine. Afaik Tails, Lib

Re: [tor-talk] Multiple servers with SAME hidden service

and...@torproject.is wrote (20 Oct 2012 16:01:01 GMT) : > The last to publish a descriptor wins. I do this now for some of my own > hidden services. The relevant keys are copied to multiple machines. If > one goes offline, the others become used. > This is more like failover than load balancing, b

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks is broken and unmaintained

27;m carrying in the Debian package! I guess next step is to talk to Robert, and perhaps put a 1.2.1 bugfix release out, that would include some long-standing proposed fixes, and prove the world that upstream is alive and kicking again. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.p

Re: [tor-talk] IsolateSOCKSUser vs IsolateSOCKSAuth bug in documentation or design?

adrelanos wrote (03 Nov 2012 13:37:04 GMT) : > Which one is correct? $ echo "SOCKSPort 1 IsolateSOCKSUser" > /tmp/intrigeri/torrc $ tor -f /tmp/intrigeri/torrc [...] [warn] Unrecognized SocksPort option '"IsolateSOCKSUser"' Cheers,

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks is broken and unmaintained

ll go on carrying it in Debian if it is not merged upstream. No emergency in either case, Nick's careful plan looks totally sensible to me. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffe

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks is broken and unmaintained

o solve the "synchronize remote and local IMAP servers with offlineimap" usecase, and similar: https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/issues/detail?id=28 Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerpri

Re: [tor-talk] tor breaks after applying firewall

hi, charlie.m...@riseup.net wrote (29 Nov 2012 13:39:31 GMT) : > If I then apply my firewall ping failed and no access to internet. I think this is off-topic, and I suggest you find a better suited place for basic iptables/netfilter support. > iptables -N lan As far as I can see, this chain is

Re: [tor-talk] how tails sync the clock afer network connection ?

Hi, charlie.mail wrote (01 Dec 2012 06:07:49 GMT) : > I have seen tails sync the clock with UTC just after a network > connection and start browser. How does it do so. It is the ntpupdate ? Please direct questions about Tails to the Tails communication channels. Anyhow: https://tails.boum.org/co

Re: [tor-talk] Interested in a Tor Browser update script for Debian, Ubuntu and derivatives?

adrelanos wrote (08 Dec 2012 13:02:54 GMT) : > What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor > Browser updater? While working on the Tails incremental updates feature [1], I discovered (thanks to Robert Ransom) that, in some threat models one often considers when using Tor, upgrades are muc

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks 1.3 is tagged and released

e canonical way to get the released code? Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.tor

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks 1.3 is tagged and released

Hi, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (12 Feb 2013 16:40:01 GMT) : > Would you like a tar.gz and a tar.gz.asc? A Git tag integrates perfectly with packaging workflow... iff it's the canonical form of distribution of the complete upstream release. If a tarball with slightly different content (e.g. that inclu

Re: [tor-talk] Tails Mac support [Was: Training Journalists in Istanbul]

brid_ISO/ [2] http://git.immerda.ch/?p=amnesia.git;a=blob;f=wiki/src/doc/first_steps/manual_usb_installation/mac.mdwn;hb=165da525a2b0e3b84afba1cd4da532ba8e85da73 [3] https://tails.boum.org/todo/UEFI/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks 1.3 is tagged and released

Hi, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (12 Feb 2013 19:25:59 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> A Git tag integrates perfectly with packaging workflow... iff it's the >> canonical form of distribution of the complete upstream release. >> [...] > I'll discuss it with nickm and see

Re: [tor-talk] torsocks 1.3 is tagged and released

s page [1], for the torsocks component. I managed to get myself such a report by modifying the URL of another existing report, but I doubt everyone would do that. [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrige

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] Tails Mac support

torians could probably build long lists of such things that could be said about Tails, but life's too short for me to do this work :) Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/i

Re: [tor-talk] What is up with: tails-i386-0.17.1?

iso file. The signature file is a real signature file but the > iso file consists of html saying that there is no iso file. I can reproduce none of these problems, sorry. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR f

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

Hi, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (19 Jul 2012 23:48:48 GMT) : > intrigeri: >> So, Jake tells me that ChromeOS will use tlsdate by default, and that >> this should solve the fingerprinting issue. Therefore, I assume this >> implicitly answer the (half-rhetorical, I admit) questio

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] secure and simple network time (hack)

ed that you don't use it, but I could not find what /etc/tlsdate/tlsdated.conf ChromeOS is using, so I don't know.) Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc

Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] secure and simple network time (hack)

Hi, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (17 Apr 2013 08:58:32 GMT) : > What version of htpdate are you shipping currently? This is documented there: https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Time_syncing/#index2h2 Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.

Re: [tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

e very grateful if this happens. [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-January/008551.html Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoi

Re: [tor-talk] Tails statistics / browser homepage [Was: CloudFlare]

ke. As I'm sure you are interested in drawing conclusions from more precise technical information, I suggest you read the "3.4 Notification of security issues and new Tails release" section of our design document, that points to the actual code: https://tails.boum.org/contribute/d

Re: [tor-talk] TorWall - experimental transparent Tor proxy for Windows

since 0.10, released in January, 2012. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@li

Re: [tor-talk] Strangeness when upgrading to Tor v. 0.2.1.30

~~lenny+1_all.deb' (from the Tor repository too). > Is it normal? The answer is in the question :) Seems like the first step upgraded the package called "tor" (tor_0.2.1.30-1~~lenny+1_amd64.deb), while the second step upgraded the package called "tor-geoipdb" (tor-geoipd

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and VOIP ( related to excito's b3)

Håken Hveem wrote (06 Apr 2011 12:00:57 GMT) : > To me, it looks like that the slower network rate of Tor will cause > problems for SIP and VOIP applications. Doable, see this thread in the list archive: http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Dec-2010/msg00147.html Bye, -- intrigeri | Gnu

[tor-talk] Announce: Tails 0.7 is out

we are heading to. Would you want to help? As explained in our brand new "how to contribute" documentation [5], here are many ways **you** can contribute to Tails: no need to be a hardcore developer. [4] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/roadmap/ [5] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/ Bye

Re: [tor-talk] To Toggle, or not to Toggle: The End of Torbutton

proved e.g. by shipping a Portable VirtualBox on the USB stick; see the dedicated page [1] in our TODO list. [1] https://tails.boum.org/todo/virtualization_support/ Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.pti

Re: [tor-talk] To Toggle, or not to Toggle: The End of Torbutton

ld tickets of this bug: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2880 I'll summarize the discussion results there. In the meantime, I prefer using email if you don't mind. Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fing

Re: [tor-talk] built-in tor2web functionalities into TOR?

u intend to make every such proxy reachable by non-Tor-users? Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | Then we'll come from the shadows. __

Re: [tor-talk] sftp sites?

of better results achieved by others. Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | Do not be trapped by the need to achieve anything.

Re: [tor-talk] Vidalia 0.3.0-alpha is out

Hi, Tomas Touceda wrote (12 May 2011 03:13:15 GMT) : > Vidalia-0.3.0-alpha is out! Nice to hear. Any reason why it is tagged vidalia-0.3.0 in Git? Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ ht

Re: [tor-talk] tor+virtualbox questions

ails.boum.org/contribute/design/ ... it may convince you you actually don't want to undertake that mission, and you may eventually prefer to help us making Tails better :) Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint

Re: [tor-talk] Tor TLS error

? Not really, but enabling starttls mode makes it work: $ /usr/bin/torify openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 83.223.73.105:465 [...] 250 STARTTLS Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanard

Re: [tor-talk] unbound, ttdnsd and DNSPort config

tdnsd by default, and only use the Tor resolver for .onion/.exit... unless I missed something. So I'm curious what the rationale for the "empty reply" behavior is. Any ideas? Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fing

Re: [tor-talk] unbound, ttdnsd and DNSPort config

Hi, Robert Ransom wrote (09 Jun 2011 08:02:00 GMT) : > This looks like a bug. Please open a Trac ticket for it. Done: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3369 Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ ht

Re: [tor-talk] Designing a secure "Tor box" for safe web browsing?

, which is frustrating. Although not that strongly related, this discussion makes me think of an idea that's been sleeping for a while in Tails' wishlist: https://tails.boum.org/todo/Two-layered_virtualized_system/ Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org

Re: [tor-talk] Pirate Linux

to share as much work as we can. [0] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/ Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | We're dreaming of something else.

Re: [tor-talk] presentation about tor and onion routing?

htalk.pdf (available as .odp too) in: https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/ (seems like this repo wasn't migrated to Git yet) bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir

Re: [tor-talk] attacks on Tor hidden services

s up, with typical delay of a minute or so. This might be a bug in Tails. If you're willing to help us investigate it on Tails side, let's move the discussion there: https://tails.boum.org/bug_reporting/ Bye, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/in

Re: [tor-talk] tails on Microsoft Virtual PC

x. What's possible is: host-to-guest and/or guest-to-host. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | Do not be trapped by the need to achieve anything. |

Re: [tor-talk] tails on Microsoft Virtual PC

a rasa" way. On the contrary, when run in a VM, it totally depends on your *host* OS how much "tabula rasa" it will be in practice, and there's nothing Tails can do to protect you from that. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrig

Re: [tor-talk] Running tails headless ... virtualbox ...

t's what you mean by "KVM", you do not need hardware virtualization support to run Tails inside VirtualBox. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/int

Re: [tor-talk] TBB, iptables, and seperation of concerns

nt non-Tor communications? I was reading something > which suggested it was an idea. If it is an idea chances are it isn't > implemented. It does. Details: https://tails.boum.org/about/ https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.p

Re: [tor-talk] TBB, iptables, and seperation of concerns

and fixing much more complicated: currently, one runs "Tails 0.9", not "Tails 0.9 plus this and that upgrades". Also, please be kind enough to quickly sum-up what is the exact problem you are suggesting us to solve, so that other Tails developers don't need to read the who

Re: [tor-talk] Did we decide about bad exits ? Where does bittorrent fall ?

is piece of software for safeness in Tails usecase. This, added to reading this thread, makes me doubtful. What do you think? Shall we include a (carefully audited) BitTorrent client in Tails? Regards, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc |

Re: [tor-talk] [tor-announce] Tor 0.2.2.35 is released (security patches)

un arbitrary code already; and Tails does not configure Tor to use another SOCKS proxy. Please correct me if needed. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | We

Re: [tor-talk] janusvm still safe?

d disk (e.g. "thanks" to swap) which violates the Tails "amnesic" property. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/int

Re: [tor-talk] browser with best privacy without using Tornetwork

Hi, slightly OT: among people interested in these matters, maybe one of a few would want to test and research evercookies? --> https://tails.boum.org/todo/Fight_evercookies/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerpr

Re: [tor-talk] Did we decide about bad exits ? Where does bittorrent fall ?

r/ticket/4639 Sure we did. We're slowly discussing most of it and are preparing answers (== todo++, asking for clarification, or explanation of why we disagree) to every issue raised. However, we're currently prioritizing the final bits of Tails 0.10 over this. Cheers, -- intr

Re: [tor-talk] difference ttdnsd and torrc DNSPort?

using *only* ttdnsd makes you rely on a very small number of upstream DNS servers; if you do so, whatever hostname they decide does not exist any more, does not exist anymore for you. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerpr

Re: [tor-talk] difference ttdnsd and torrc DNSPort?

intrigeri wrote (10 Jan 2012 06:50:37 GMT) : > One reason why we did not drop DNSPort in Tails, which using ttdnsd One should read "... , while using ttdnsd ...". Sorry for the confusing typo. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/

Re: [tor-talk] Tor survey

g such private information is useful to make this attack more efficient (or working). Regards, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | Who wants a world in which the guarantee

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Gateway and Tor Workstation by ra

Martin Hubbard wrote (21 Jan 2012 03:13:44 GMT) : > Users may break TAILS trying to watch YouTube. For the record, Tails 0.10 allows watching videos that YouTube and other video sites make available as HTML5. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrig

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Gateway and Tor Workstation by ra

> invisible and the Tor Workstation what top you see right now. See similar ideas on our wishlist / todo list: https://tails.boum.org/todo/Two-layered_virtualized_system/ https://tails.boum.org/todo/autorun_in_Windows/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intri

Re: [tor-talk] Odd connection probles in Tails 0.10

py to reply when you ask through one of the many Tails communication channels. See you soon then :) Yes, the line is pretty blurry between what is specific to Tails and what is not. Sorry about that. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intri

Re: [tor-talk] irc clients and Tor

oblem, I'll upload a backport to the official Squeeze backports archive once it has migrated to testing, i.e. in one week from now. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri

Re: [tor-talk] GnuPG and Tor

Michael Carbone wrote (15 Jul 2014 19:11:15 GMT) : > https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/code/parcimonie/ Currently down => better install from Debian (if using this distribution, or a derivative) or get the source from https://packages.debian.org/source/sid/parcimonie

Re: [tor-talk] GnuPG and Tor

Red Sonja wrote (16 Jul 2014 11:58:41 GMT) : > Do you have anything less demanding? *I* haven't. See the shell version, linked by Michael earlier on this thread. I haven't looked at it in details, no idea if it satisfies the same design goals etc. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] how many verify their tbb ?

Hi, mick wrote (29 Jul 2014 14:54:10 GMT) : > I have just checked on my tails mirror and I get the slightly > depressing results below: > [...] > which I make 0.68% Our download page has been pointing to our own website for downloading the detached signature file for a few months, which explains

Re: [tor-talk] how many verify their tbb ?

f it, draft an email we could send them, think how we would receive and store the data, and retrieve useful info from it: I certainly wouldn't mind :) Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.to

Re: [tor-talk] Merging all languages (locales) into one Tor Browser package?

Hi, Sebastian G. wrote (07 Sep 2014 12:29:15 GMT) : > Upsides: + will make it easier for Tails to switch to using the Tor Browser binaries. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Weekly News — September 3rd, 2014

oum.org/support/ Thanks! Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] Luks and Tails: (why can I not access encrypted folder?)

Hi, please don't cross-post. This will be replied on tails-support@. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] How to disable Tor Browser's Internal Updater?

rences, app.update.enabled in > particular. Indeed, in Tails we do: pref("app.update.enabled", false); Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] Including Adblock to TBB to save bandwith

Hi, Justaguy wrote (15 Dec 2014 13:44:05 GMT) : > What if torbrowser would include adblock, this would reduce the amount of > bandwith > used, and thus increase the overal speeds @ tor See "5. No filters" in https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy C

Re: [tor-talk] Where's longclaw

lu...@riseup.net wrote (16 Jan 2015 19:18:06 GMT) : > Riseup Networks has been getting DDoS'd sporadically these couple of days, > this > probably explains the outage of their dir auth. s/days/weeks/ Actually, that DDoS has started at the beginning of 31C3 :/ Cheers, -- intriger

[tor-talk] Which PTs shall we prioritize for inclusion in Tails?

ones should we prioritize our efforts on? (An option is of course "all, just take whatever the Tor Browser ships", but it's not obvious that it's the best solution for us, hence my question.) Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To u

Re: [tor-talk] Removal of Vidalia content from our website

Kevin wrote (09 Feb 2015 15:59:53 GMT) : > Why is it no longer supported? Because there are better options for the use cases the Tor Project is actively supporting, and nobody has volunteered to maintain Vidalia upstream in the last few years. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list -

Re: [tor-talk] Which PTs shall we prioritize for inclusion in Tails?

Thanks for the input! -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and HTTP/2?

won't be widespread enough to be very useful for pluggable transports before a while. No idea if the protocol has specific issues that will delay its support in Tor Browser until later than whenever Firefox ESR supports HTTP/2. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torp

Re: [tor-talk] Why obfs4 bridges aren't work in Tails?

Hi, FYI, when we tested Tails 1.3.2, we could successfully use obfs4 bridges. Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] Client obfs4 Trouble

bridge_mode/ Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] vpn+tor in tails

Hi, Petru Daniel Diaconu wrote (25 May 2015 09:56:56 GMT) : > Can you make so that you install cyberghost in tails [...] Please use the Tails support channels for Tails questions: https://tails.boum.org/support/ Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-talk] Hacking Team looking at Tails

w set of external antennas for the TNI (Andrea) > o Creation o a mini-TNI (Andrea)$ transportable by a drone, without > any melting constraints > o Creation of a micro-TNI (Andrea)$ HW of a mobile $ It will have a > subset of the functionality Cheers, -- intrigeri -- tor-talk maili

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