I am compiling a list of use cases that Tor's current slowness makes
impossible/unpleasant. Roger once said, "Whatever you use Tor for someone
will use it for something else."
So with this in mind I'm asking you all for things you (or others) would
like to do through Tor but slowness makes it too
Thanks Sebastian G! I don't watch much Youtube, but blocked YouTube is a
great example! Thank you!! Uploads is also another great use case.
If porn isn't a sufficiently canon use-case, while behind Tor, I personally
find it difficult to enjoy the video content on NYTimes or the Washington
Post'
rance/dearth-of-creativity?
And just to be clear, Andrea's followup suggestion addresses the special
case of cooridination among HSs in which each HS is under your control?
-V
On Sunday, July 27, 2014, Mirimir wrote:
> On 07/27/2014 09:24 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>
>
>
>
The variability is def a big deal, from a UX perspective, maybe even larger
one than raw speed---I can relate to the occasional Pyongyang circuits.
Out of curiosity, are there stats on the average speed (error bars would be
nice) over the past few years? Just curious. This would be helpful. Im
Theoretically you could look at the historical data from the beginning of
time and fit an exponential curve to it and see what it comes out to, but I
suspect there is an accepted/established answer to this question.
If not, references to the data for me to calculate it would be helpful.
-V
--
to
I have a question on the exported data from metrics.torproject.org.
When downloading the "bandwidth" data as a CSV from:
https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html
I've been unable to determine the units of the exported CSV file.
For example, according to the graph the current total "advertis
I've been looking through the various historical data from
metrics.torproject.org.
If you plot the 'used bandwidth' divided by the 'advertised bandwidth'
(meant to be a rough measure of network congestion), you get three distinct
groups, seen here:
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/3308162/three_groups.png
; have a
> preceding slope indicating that something started before your limits,
> and they seem to be normal variations of a general down slope that
> started in 2013.
>
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 12:54 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > I've been looking through the var
Or, if I were to dream, to highlight the differences between two Tor
consensus files?
-V
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And just to be pedantically clear, the data on metrics.torproject.org is
computed from the collecTor historical consensus files?
-V
On Wednesday, August 13, 2014, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Or, if I were to dream, to highlight the differences between two Tor
> consensus files?
>
>
I am interested in the diffs between two consensus files. E.g.,
* which relays are in only one of the two consensus files
* substantial changes in advertised/read bandwidth for a relay in both
consensus files
-V
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I've been parsing the historical collecTor consensus files using the Stem
library. I want to be able to recreate the existing numbers before I delve
into new stuff, so I am attempting to recreate some datapoints from the
Metrics site.
The "router status entries", queried by:
*
https://stem.torpro
This isn't exactly what you asked, but read the first few sections of this
where it looks for bottlenecks.
http://www.robgjansen.com/publications/kist-sec2014.pdf
-V
On Sunday, August 17, 2014, Mike Fikuart wrote:
> Hi Tor-Talk,
>
> I am interested in the scaling limits to Tor and what present
Particularly, the cool new onion with the circuit-onion logo?
I see you can buy them for $65 each for a donation. Is it possible to get
them cheaper, or is the cost of them set artificially high?
-V
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For whatever it's worth I was going to suggest migrating the shirts to
Hanes Beefy Ts. At Caltech it's what we always made department shirts
from. They are the standard high-end T-shirt (thickness, long lasting,
etc.).
-V
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Moritz, you are exactly the person I would expect to know this. I sit
disabused and my buying habits corrected.
-V
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The Tor Store hasn't been updated with the new design.
www.printfection.com/torprojectstore
If the onion-circuit-board shirts were available from there, I would buy
them.
-V
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https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SaBK664SchhZOP9XBsB8KK63k4xlmMTlkhfF28f2204/pub
I shared some of these with Griffin at USENIX, but I figured it was time to
share with the larger Tor community. I'd like to make this a post on Tor
blog if someone can hook me up with that.
I still consider this
I believe in a day in which you don't have to think about the impact on
others when streaming gigabytes over Tor.
-V
On Wednesday, September 3, 2014, CJ wrote:
>
>
> On 09/04/2014 12:23 AM, Tim Retout wrote:
> > Hi!
> >
> > If you can access BBC iPlayer, you might be interested in tonight's
> >
> So I guess the question is: what conclusions should we draw from Figure
3? If it levels off or goes down in the future, does that indicate a bad
thing in any way?
Given that the average bandwidth across the world is increasing, it would
be quite concerning if the average relay bandwidth for the
If that ascent is due to you, this screams to the success of the
torservers.net model. It might be useful to see that plot without
Torservers.net in there. If I figure out how to make sense of the raw
consensus file I may plot it.
-V
On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:15 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> Hi Vi
Two points.
> I don't think there's a lot of money to be made in the first place
The major proposals I've seen don't aspire to make operating a relay
profitable, but merely *subsidize* the money + time involved in operating a
relay. I see it akin to automated, decentralized grants akin to the ki
carlo, if you want a place to implement these ideas, look at automating
traffic peering agreements. It's not very sexy, but it would be an
immediate, marketable improvement over the existing system.
-V
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Can someone suggest to me how to calculate the probability that a node will
be selected for a circuit? Failing that, pointing me to the spec for the
selection algorithm might be enough.
-V
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> apparently all pedos are windoz-users
Odd. I'd think if anything pedos would "think different".
-V
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URL:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SaBK664SchhZOP9XBsB8KK63k4xlmMTlkhfF28f2204/pub
New highlights:
* After filtering out the bot-net window, there's a stronger
relationship between increasing advertised bandwidth and faster
Torperf.
* Corroborated the above finding by showing that low "re
I just realized there's a better way to control for some of these
effects using multivariate models. Another update will come later.
-V
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use a suggested reference text.
>
> is the dataset small enough to use on a desktop stats package or does it
> require something beyond a typical desktop?
>
>
> On 15/09/2014 8:57 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>
>> I just realized there's a better way to control for som
Articles like these are irresponsible. But at least the journalist did
sufficient homework to find a few "alternatives" I hadn't heard of.
-V
On Monday, September 22, 2014, Katya Titov wrote:
> Article named "Best Alternatives to Tor: 12 Programs to Use Since NSA,
> Hackers Compromised Tor Pro
Perhaps weirdly, this fellow does seem to know what he is doing.
On page, https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl
He explicitly offers a different list for blocking just exits. The
only thing I can think of is to email a request that he block just
exists instead of overblocking all Tor nodes.
-V
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Well now that it's been mentioned in tor-talk maybe it'll appear next
time Mr. DANIEL AUSTIN MBCS Googles himself.
-V
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I actually always figured the opposite---that knowing someone was Tor
user was surprisingly quite valuable for advertisers. You know the
viewer is technically literate and interested in security and privacy.
I don't study ads or anything, but this sounds like a target
demographic to me. If nothin
I hereby submit the following PDF as a Tor Tech Report.
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/3308162/tor%20growth.pdf
I'll be providing the various raw data files to github/torproject shortly.
Qualitative conclusions are the same. The methodology is more
rigorous than it was before, some quantitative differ
ir wrote:
> On 10/04/2014 05:57 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > I hereby submit the following PDF as a Tor Tech Report.
> >
> > http://dl.dropbox.com/u/3308162/tor%20growth.pdf
> >
> > I'll be providing the various raw data files to github/torproject
> sho
I'm attempting to quantify the proportion of traffic used by hidden
services. When connecting to hidden services, are exit nodes ever used
(unless the exit node also has a guard flag)?
-V
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researchers setup an exit node and then recorded what sites people
were going to?
(I'm writing a funding proposal paper and I need this citation. Sorry
for my ignorance, I'm still not quite versed in the Tor academic
literature. I should probably just sit down for a month and read the
greatest h
Yes! The Huber paper! Thank you Philipp! You rock!
-V
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I am working on fixing up some aspects of tor2web. I've heard talk of
using the term "onion service" or "tor service" instead of "hidden
service". I actually like both of these better than "hidden service"
(which I feel is too ambiguous about which aspects are
hidden/not-hidden).
However, I'm no
I'll start trying "onion service" and just see if it catches on.
-V
On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 03:39:05PM -0800, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>> I am working on fixing up some aspects of tor2web. I've heard tal
Onion sites sounds nice to me too. But we might have to change the
name to from tor2web to onion2web.
-V
On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 9:32 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Nathan Freitas writes:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 12, 2014, at 11:38 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>> > I'll start
Juan: Poking Alec over his employer is inappropriate.
First, any collaboration between facebook and the US government is
undoubtably handled by a different department than Alec. Second, Alec is
doing valuable work popularizing Tor within a mainstream Silicon Valley
company and further "normalizes"
If an expensive marketing company were trying to come up with a term to
describe more anonymous networks such as .onion, even though "dark net"
certainly fits, they would probably discourage it because of the reasons
previously mentioned.
I don't like "deep web", and I think we can do better than
Right now I perceive consensus in accepting the term "onion services"
as a synonym for "hidden services", and when it's specifically a
website, also suggesting the more specific term, "onion site".
Cool. I support that. For nonnative speakers it might sometimes to
be useful to say "onion-site" t
Anyone on list know of anyone?
-V
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This exists.
https://learn.adafruit.com/onion-pi/overview
But I suggest doing it on a Beagle Bone Black. It can handle so much
more traffic than a raspberry pi. Joshua Dakto is the
point-of-contact for this.
-- http://datko.net/
-V
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 8:45 PM, wrote:
> I've been very in
Petition the blackphone people for this. If they are willing to fund
it certainly possible to get it done.
-V
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 2:47 AM, wrote:
> Hello everybody,
>
> With all of the great development happening around the Tor network this
> holiday season, it seems fitting to ask for som
The X in Xmas derives from the Greek letter Chi, which stands for Christ.
This usage dates back at least to the Middle Ages.
-V
On Friday, December 26, 2014, m wrote:
> It's CHRISTmas you jerk, not xmas
>
> stop that insulting nonsense already
>
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> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.tor
gt;
>
> On 12/26/2014 03:19 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>
>> The X in Xmas derives from the Greek letter Chi, which stands for Christ.
>> This usage dates back at least to the Middle Ages.
>>
>> -V
>>
>> On Friday, December 26, 2014, m wrote:
>>
&
If yes, it'd be nice to know what your aims are in the Sybil attack.
Because thus far it is unclear to me what your motives or objectives
are.
-V
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I need to estimate these numbers for research proposal I am writing.
>From the metrics.torproject.org data, I calculate approximately ~2.5
million clients. Is this correct?
Likewise, from metrics.torproject.org, I see approximately 6500
relays. Is there an estimate on the number of *distinct re
I could look this up via the trac, but I suspect someone on the list
"just knows" the answer.
-V
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If an existing website simply wants to improve performance for Tor
users, my understanding is that it's more efficient simply to run an
Exit Enclave instead of a hidden service. Is that true?
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ExitEnclave
-V
On Thu, Jan 1, 2015 at 5:06 PM, Colin
ve.
>
> T
>
> Xiaolan.Me:
>> does any CA can issue SSL-CERT to an .onion address?
>>
>> 2015-01-02 9:17 GMT+08:00 Virgil Griffith :
>>
>>> If an existing website simply wants to improve performance for
>>> Tor users, my understanding is that it&
I think the claim is that by default people want to be anonymous, but
also be able to (voluntarily) prove their identity. If someone wants
to do that, who am I to judge their anonymity goals? We can argue
that this is too impractical to accomplish, but if it's not a huge
amount of effort, the mor
For example, if you run an exit node, your regular traffic is
disguised by exit traffic also coming from your ip#. Is there
anything similar for running a bridge node?
-V
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yeah I figured. Just checking.
-V
On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Xiaolan.Me wrote:
> No, bridge is similar an Entry Node...
>
> 2015-01-08 15:43 GMT+08:00 Virgil Griffith :
>
>> For example, if you run an exit node, your regular traffic is
>> disguised by exit traff
i am concerned about https not being enough to protect tor2web users. In
particular, I am concerned about what subdomain a user is visiting being
leaked. Are there any established ways of preventing the subdomain from
being leaked? Because none spring to my mind.
-V
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I present:
http://onion.city
currently searching ~348,000 pages according to site:onion.city on GOOG.
-V
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See the FAQ. It's on the roadmap.
On Feb 11, 2015 2:17 PM, "Alexandros" wrote:
> On 02/11/2015 11:10 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > I present:
> >
> > http://onion.city
> >
> > currently searching ~348,000 pages according to site:onion.city on
Is there any difference between the MEMEX dark-web search engine and
something like ahmia.fi or onion.city?
Because if they are funding a search engine I'd claim leveraging extant
community projects is a good idea.
-V
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- How does the custom google search thing works? Where does it get its
index? You expose all the tor2web onions on your sitemap, so google
crawls them and generates an index?
Correct :) Everything available on the Google Custom Search is also
available on a regular google search with the qu
Leeroy, to avoid being indexed by Googlebot et al, place the appropriate
/robots.txt at your root. It's described in the FAQ.
http://www.onion.city/faq.html
As a historical note, the reason Aaron and I chose Tor2web's URL design was
so search engines would automatically see any /robots.txt an on
> Are OnionCity staff reviewing and redacting those lists to protect users
from themselves? Or is redaction based only on complaints?
We do both.
> For some privacy, users can instead search https://startpage.com/ with
"site:onion.city", and then view using the Ixquick Proxy. Could
OnionCity scr
I'm not too surprised that list ruffled some feathers. Per your request,
I'll take it down. :)
If/when people get more used to the idea of being seen on the clear-net the
Disallowed might be resurrected.
Give the changes a few days to propagate.
-V
On Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 1:16 AM, George Kadia
> If a list stops fulfilling these criteria, people like us unsubscribe,
leaving the list to its inevitable decline,
> destined to join the ever-lengthening roll of moribund, flame-filled
lists that no longer exist or have ceased > to serve any useful function on
the net.
I personally support more
I suppose it's sufficient just to block the tinhatters on the client end.
It also means automagically not feeding them---a nice bonus.
*mad tinhatters added*.
-V
On Sun, Mar 8, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Lara wrote:
> Libertas:
> > I think that "legitimate" can probably be defined as "containing some
>
"We still lack the "gamification" Relay Challenge website that Virgil
was talking about. It would just sum up all relays of a family, and
then it really does not matter any more."
for what it's worth this website has been started. I'll post a beta to
tor-talk when it's presentable. I remain very
Here's the gist:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006975.html
On Saturday, March 21, 2015, Nusenu wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> > "We still lack the "gamification" Relay Challenge website that
> > Virgil was talking about. It would just s
I've heard of some ISPs having metered ipv4 but unmetered ipv6. Make
all of your instances ipv6 only and you might be able to get more
bang-per-buck.
-V
On Sat, Apr 18, 2015 at 4:55 AM, nusenu wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
>> - Bandwidth: the instances being used
Tom: wonderful summary! Thank you for putting it together!
Minor quip: On pages 15 and 16, you say that the Tor network is
speeding up. When you normalize by the average bandwidth around the
world, I came to the conclusion that Tor speeds where actually flat.
See table 2 of
https://research.torp
Tom: If a hostile relay receives a connection from a ip-address A that
is not listed in the Tor consensus, as far as I understand the hostile
relay stills has two possibilities about ip-address A:
(1) A is the client
(2) A is a bridge
I do not understand how the "reverse renumeration" attack you
If so can initiate making all tor2web clients use IPv6 by default.
-V
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I mean having the Tor clients on tor2web sites set "ClientUseIPv6 1"
and/or "ClientPreferIPv6 1".
-V
On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
> Do you mean having the Tor clients on tor2web sites set "ClientUseIPv6 1"
> and/or "ClientPreferIPv6 1"?
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Anything for you buttercup.
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/images/tor-logo-root-design.svg
-V
On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 5:07 PM, Jan GUTH wrote:
> Hello list,
>
> Does someone have any idea where I am able to find the 'roots-circuit'
> [0] logo in a higher resolution, or ev
Hello tor-talk!
I have an operations question for those in high-security orgs:
* How do you manage your private keys?
* How do you do recover from a key-compromise?
I ask because there's talk among Singaporean financial tech firms
about migrating to more transparent (yay!) blockchain-based
crypto
intending to use Tor for?
I know the classic story of US intelligence agents wanting to phone home
from Beijing hotels without Chinese intelligence knowing they were phoning
home as a partial motivation for open-sourcing Tor.
But what was the Navy/military originally hoping to use Tor-related
pro
> old at that point.) We had a picture where the ordering
> information went over the Web from the Pentagon to Domino's and was
> routed by an enemy (Iraq at the time of the putative pizza channel
> concern). I remember a point I would make during presentations was
> that the enemy could see the n
> shut which i think is profoundly antithetical to
> anything ANYONE working on tor project would
> desire
Being asked to take a conversation to another room so the communal space
remains productive in other ways coincides with the desire of many adults
working on the Tor project.
On Sat, 1 Aug 20
I propose the creation of an alternative mailing list where pressing issues
like the ones in this thread can get airing, attention, and discussion they
deserve.
For such a list I propose the candidate name of
tor-o...@lists.torptoject.org
-V
On Sat, 1 Aug 2015 at 04:45 Virgil Griffith wrote
I delegate this thread to tor-opent...@lists.torproject.org
On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 1:05 PM, Juan wrote:
> On Mon, 3 Aug 2015 07:16:43 +0300
> Cari Machet wrote:
>
>> https://youtu.be/qXajND7BQzk?t=27m40s
>>
>> here is on camera explanation of why the navy wants you to use
>> tor ... if YOU don
t;The
Pizza Channel" or enabling field-agents to covertly phone home.
-V
On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Juan wrote:
> On Mon, 3 Aug 2015 14:41:18 +0800
> Virgil Griffith wrote:
>
>> I delegate this thread to tor-opent...@lists.torproject.org
>
>
> By the way,
"In general, networks should be configured to deny access to websites such
as www.torproject.org"
Blocking Tor exit nodes is one thing, but this is just bizarre. They could
make a claim that privacy from your boss is something they wish to prevent,
but I saw no such claim.
On Thu, 27 Aug 2015 at
For example, some things I'd like to know:
* Is a specified hidden-service listed in the directory servers at all?
* What is the specified introduction point for a hidden service?
* Is the specified introduction point for the HS reachable?
etc.
-V
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At tor2web we've found a number of popular .onion sites coming up as
infinite redirects. It seems this is due to sites wishing to protect
themselves from the Onion Cloner script and tor2web is collateral damage. I
have a two questions:
(1) what are the current techniques for detecting Onion Cloner
n. Maybe OnioNS will improve matters.
-V
On Tue, 8 Sep 2015 at 11:20 grarpamp wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 11:23 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > At tor2web we've found a number of popular .onion sites coming up as
> > infinite redirects.
>
> > tor2web is collate
The usual example given for this is, "if you don't want to share your
amount of Facebook use with your ISP or the NSA, Facebook supports you
doing that."
On Sat, 19 Sep 2015 at 17:19 Martijn Grooten
wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 at 09:19:12AM +0300, Qaz wrote:
> > What good does https://facebookc
ple, Fast, Flexible, and Cheap Website Authentication"
> pdf of paper and
> slides available at http://ieee-security.org/TC/SPW2015/W2SP/
>
> We also have a revised and expanded paper reflecting subsequent
> developments in the works.
>
> aloha,
> Paul
>
> On Sat, Sep 1
The CollecTor logo made me smile. +1
Rest are good too. Obviously improvements over the old! Now we just want
a Roster logo? ;)
-V
On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 4:17 AM Karsten Loesing
wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> Leiah Jansen made three wonderful n
For unrelated reasons I'm meeting with Cloudflare. Can someone enlighten
me on the current state of the captcha situation? Presuming they are
unwilling to completely drop the captcha, what would be a step in the right
direction?
The last I heard from Cloudflare is:
https://support.cloudflare.com
These are all wonderful. Thank you all!
Okay, I'll bring these up and see if I can nudge the needle in the right
direction. It's not much, but every little bit helps?
-V
On Sat, 3 Oct 2015 at 08:25 Griffin Boyce wrote:
> Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > For unrelated reaso
he cached version. But if a cached version does not exist, cached
version exists, to spit it out, but if a cached copy does not already
exist, to return the captcha?
-V
On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 2:07 PM wrote:
> Quoting Virgil Griffith (2015-10-03 01:40:22)
> > Presuming they are
> >
Please see:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-incentives-research-roundup-goldstar-par-braids-lira-tears-and-torcoin
-V
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 4:04 PM Alex NoName wrote:
> Hello!
> I have some ideas to improve tor project and I'm not sure that I'm writing
> in right place. I'm operating a to
At current growth rates it will be a while.
https://research.torproject.org/techreports/tor-growth-2014-10-04.pdf
On Tue, 13 Oct 2015 at 10:44 Marcos Eugenio Kehl
wrote:
> Hello cripto experts!
>
> 1. When we will have a super speed Tor? I mean, a HD video streaming from
> a hidden service.
>
I re-iterate a request for the tor-opentalk@ list.
-V
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 2:58 PM Josef Stautner wrote:
> Hello Juan,
>
> I can't understand why you subscribe to a list of "scammers" then. You
> escalated very quickly and showed a rude attitude most people can't
> stand and normally silentl
I accuse Juan of being the actual mole here. He so masterfully keeps us
muttering to each other/him instead of working productively.
http://fortune.com/2015/09/30/workplace-bureaucracy-simple-sabotage/
On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 12:35 PM grarpamp wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 10:03 PM, Justi
Instead of WOT, it seems more desirable, and better fit diversity, to have
both your best friends and worst enemies on the same circuit. Ergo,
minimizing chance of collaboration.
-V
On Mon, 26 Oct 2015 at 01:30 grarpamp wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 8:44 AM, tor-dev had:
> > I agree with Roge
is motivation above is a
plausible reason to have more "non-activist" types running Tor relays---we
just have too many friends, a few foes would be a welcome addition!
-V
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 1:11 PM Tim Wilson-Brown - teor
wrote:
>
> > On 28 Oct 2015, at 14:31, Virgil
Im not sure how one proposes this, but could we get a code review on
OnionMap and then move it to
https://map.torproject.org ?
-V
On Thu, 12 Nov 2015 at 06:39 Moritz Bartl wrote:
> On 11/11/2015 10:55 PM, opi wrote:
> > I made some improvements recently; Onionmap now supports Onionoo
> > reques
aking CloudFlare employees aware of Tor needs.
-V
On Mon, 9 Nov 2015 at 06:10 wrote:
> Quoting Virgil Griffith (2015-10-03 01:40:22)
> > For unrelated reasons I'm meeting with Cloudflare. Can someone enlighten
> > me on the current state of the captcha situation? Presuming the
Thank you moritz! You are the blond panda bear of love.
On Fri, 13 Nov 2015 at 09:12 Moritz Bartl wrote:
> On 11/13/2015 12:59 AM, I wrote:
> > http://relaymap.torservers.net/ brings a 404
>
> It has moved to http://map.torservers.net/ -- sorry for the confusion.
>
> opi, we could move the thing
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