Is there a list of 'things' (services, web sites, etc.) that do not work well
with Tor? For example, connect to MSN using Tor and you'll find yourself being
banned. http://www.rightmove.co.uk/ refuses to work with Tor. Such a list would
be useful to check before trying to use such services, I t
When doing an "apt-get update" after adding
deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org squeeze main
to my apt sources list, I get:
W: GPG error: http://deb.torproject.org squeeze Release: The following
signatures couldn't be verified because the public key is not available:
NO_PUBKEY 74A941
When using DNSPort to resolve googlemail.com, I get the 'wrong' address:
$ host googlemail.com
googlemail.com has address 173.194.41.150
Host googlemail.com not found: 4(NOTIMP)
Host googlemail.com not found: 4(NOTIMP)
It should be something like:
$ host googlemail.com
googlemail.com has addres
On Sunday, 30 September, 2012 at 15:30:06 BST, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sun, Sep 30, 2012 at 01:47:07PM +0100, Paul wrote:
Looks like they're all the 'right' answer. My guess is that Google is
doing some sort of geodns where it chooses its answers based on where
you're as
On Monday, 01 October, 2012 at 12:38:07 BST, Mansour Moufid wrote:
Try using gmail.com instead of googlemail.com:
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=159001
Nope, same symptoms.
Another solution may be a local DNS server like tor-dns-proxy.py:
http://code.google.com/p/
I wonder if those could be related to my problem with connecting to their XMPP
service (see thread titled 'DNSPort & googlemail.com').
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. Will
it continue to be?
The source code for FireFox is available free and so the DRM
code could be striped out before making it the TOR browser.
doing so, however, will require additional effort; is TOR
prepared to take on this task?
Paul
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PAUL AT
passive attacker, would resist an active attacker. Though
providing provable guarantees against a class of active attacker, it
is not ready for primetime. See "Preventing Active Timing Attacks in
Low-Latency Anonymous Communication" at http://freehaven.net/anonbib/
aloha,
Paul
>
possible URLs to retrieve the paper, the one you
gave plus the anonbib cached version. Both of these worked for me
when I tried them a moment ago.)
HTH,
Paul
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f from this than when choosing
circuits with random entry relays. And if none of your guards is evil,
an adversary can never de-anonymize you in this way. (Never say
"never". ;>) Cf. the experiments and discussion of layered guards in
"Locating Hidden Servers", and our subsequent research on building
trust into path selection.)
aloha,
Paul
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protocol level even before that.) At best you
might reduce this from virtual certainty to a very serviceable stochastic
attack.
But that's a good thing, because otherwise Tor would be more vulnerable
to long path attacks.
aloha,
Paul
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at
https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
And more elaborate details and variants in various papers on anonbib.
HTH,
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On Tue, Mar 06, 2012 at 12:22:16PM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote:
>
> At PETS in 2009[0], Paul did a talk on 'why I'm not an entropist' and
> suggested that people need to start working on defeating a mythical
> global passive adversary. Maybe in the near future some
On Tue, Mar 06, 2012 at 08:15:58PM -0500, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 4:04 PM, Paul Syverson
> wrote:
> > I'm a mere four years behind in putting my work up on the web, and
> > this one wasn't co-authored so nobody else did either. I'll try to
On Tue, Mar 06, 2012 at 11:14:39PM -0500, Paul Syverson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 06, 2012 at 08:15:58PM -0500, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 4:04 PM, Paul Syverson
> > wrote:
> > > I'm a mere four years behind in putting my work up on the web, and
>
ven if we accept your
EER that is at least an order of magnitude worse than experiments have
found (i.e., 99%) you come up with initial anonymity sets of who is
visiting a particular website (respectively which destinations a given
client is visiting) of around 50. That is essentially zero for a b
On Thu, Apr 05, 2012 at 05:24:28AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 5, 2012 at 04:15, Ted Smith wrote:
>
> > (Also, have you missed the mail *on this list* from .mil domains?)
>
> There is Paul Syverson, who works at NRL, if I am not mistaken; did I
> miss anyone
Note that Dissent-related work is ongoing. For a recent addition
see "Scalable Anonymous Group Communication in the Anytrust Model"
It's not on anonbib, but you can get it at http://www.ohmygodel.com/
See also http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/anon/
-Paul
On Tue, Aug 07, 2012 at 0
us.
Pretty sure that's not what you meant.
But you're main point is well taken, subject to the limitation
that most people won't know exactly what their threat model should
be for any given behavior and it's best to be cautious.
aloha,
Paul
> __
vicss were designed with that as a presumed default.
Reply onions were more flexible in that regard and could be used
either way. I guess the closest current analogue to reply onions
is tor2web. Gotta run. HTH.
-Paul
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0-50% of what it
> could
> have used that month.
I don't think that's Roger's point. 1. You can induce all kinds of
congestion and scheduling messes for circuits going through you if
you're optimizing for TB/month processed. 2. There can be advantages
to the perform
from an AS-level attacker by
mandating an increase in the number of ASes that must be traversed
between client and entry node.
-Paul
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as we discussed in the alpha mixing paper mentioned earlier in
this thread can provide real benefit for some applications and
plausible adversaries (although I think what we called 'tau-mixing' in
that paper is the more likely fruitful departure point). But departure
point for someone else: there are years worth of higher-priority-to-me
Tor-related research problems to solve, so it is back-burnered
indefinitely or until somebody entices me that working on this
is worth pulling away from other things.
HTH,
Paul
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y since there the
misappropriation of the term from its original use is unambiguous and
well established).
aloha,
Paul
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I tend to think of the Debian code copies policy as encouraging
collaboration, cooperation, peer review, a culture of participation
and the spirit of free software amongst the upstream developers of
software available in Debian.
As to getting Tor Browser into Debian, this has been wanted for years
g since 1995. ;>)
-Paul
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heavily
scrutinized by a variety of people with diverse goals and
interests.
5. This is a response to the comment immediately below from Gregory
Disney. I'm not going to try to address everything mentioned in the
thread, although Nick gave a fine answer to the question about key
l
is the real Tor ;>)
Your last point is the most salient. Lots of people with lots of
different employers, funders, affiliations, etc. have contributed.
Whether they were employees or contractors of the Tor Project,
Inc., they were all part of the Tor Project.
aloha,
Paul
___
On Sun, Apr 07, 2013 at 04:30:34PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> Paul Syverson wrote:
>
> > Lots of people with lots of different employers, funders, affiliations,
> >
> etc. have contributed. Whether they were employees or contractors
> >
> of the Tor Project, I
On Mon, Apr 08, 2013 at 01:42:39AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> > Paul Syverson wrote:
>
> [... some history of Tor ...]
>
> The posts regarding this history are useful for the historical perspective
> and could be put on the website. Then anyone asking can simply be
>
On Mon, Apr 08, 2013 at 03:12:51PM -0400, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400
> Paul Syverson wrote:
> > http://www.onion-router.net/History.html
> >
> > covers what I said and then some, basically gives a brief history
> > roughly 1995-2005.
om where you usually work,
need to connect to a system of your employer, but you don't want
locals to observe where/who that is.
HTH,
Paul
>
> That said, there *is* a reason to avoid using Tor for banking: a growing
> number of banking websites use IP address to decide if you
This is definitely not my area of expertise for Tor (which is why I
didn't say anything earlier), but when you iniitially raised this
thread my kneejerk reaction was to suggest exactly this. Now we
can wait for Roger or Nick to say why it's not the good idea it seems.
-Paul
On Thu, Ma
or until 2004. The first publicly deployed Tor network was in
2003, which was also when the source code was made available and
publicly licensed under the MIT license. The first funding Roger and
Nick got to work on Tor that was other than as part of an NRL project
was from the EFF starting in
to believe and no
evidence is going to change that.
And yes there's always things to do to improve
transparency/trustability/usability/etc. People worth trusting
probably have a processes to do that and a relatively independent and
confirmable history of doing it.
HTH,
Paul
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On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 02:06:04PM -0500, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> On 3/21/2011 10:07 AM, Paul Syverson wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 02:43:22PM +0100, Anders Andersson wrote:
>>> In a scenario where the military actually
>>> would hide something in the source, all
On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 10:09:43PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
>
> > On 3/21/2011 2:39 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > >On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 02:06:04PM -0500, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> > >Last comments for a while. (All I ha
case.
Note: This is responsive to to the comment about anonymity being
broken if you identify yourself using your "real name" to a server you
access. I don't have any comments about the original question. Sorry.
aloha,
Paul
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.onion-router.net/Publications.html#IH-1996
Tor separates identification from routing so that your communication
gets where it needs to without identifying you---anonymizes the
communications pipe if you prefer. Torbutton toggles whether your
browser communicates through that pipe or not and helps
that protection is SSL encryption, arranged between your
Firefox and the server you are connecting to.)
See also
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad
Hope that helps,
Paul
__
But nothing that is both adequately practical and effective has been
discovered by any of the researchers who have investigated it, nor do
I think ever will be, at least for general purposes. As Curious Kid
noted, Tor does not attempt to prevent this b
cuits. These are used as long as everything
remains basically stable and the same. Over time, some may be
gradually replaced for various reasons.
>
>
> Thx.
HTH,
Paul
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.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/dir-spec.txt
-Paul
>
> thx
>
> > Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 09:49:47 -0400
> > From: syver...@itd.nrl.navy.mil
> > To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] <>
> >
> > On Tue
ho _do_ they work for? ;>) On a less
facetious note, people might want to look at our trust work as a more
constructive response to the diversity of geolocations, jurisdictions,
OSes, operators, Tor versions, hardware etc. [2], although it is still
research and I do no
On Thu, Jan 05, 2012 at 02:52:42PM +0100, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> On 01/05/2012 02:50 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > Hi Jake,
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 05, 2012 at 12:15:08PM +0100, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> A few Tor hackers are meeting to
do that for you automatically if you use the "Reply" or "Reply-all"
functionality.
Paul
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destination of interest, there is no reason to think
that future communication, even from the same originating client is
likely to emerge from that same node. In fact just the opposite.
aloha,
Paul
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e is, so if your suggestion works, it should
be compatible. As to your question, a main contribution of work in this
area is that one establishes revocable credentials for clients. So if
computation is a scarce resource, it would be one that clients need
spend only rarely. Once they have the creden
normal tools of
balance loading and migrating of running sessions across the TOR network. Down
side would be whether or not the existing network could cope with data
streaming.
One day when I have time I might build a VE environment and experiment such a
concept.
Warm Regards
Paul
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are that nodes with exit and/or guard flags are excluded from
> circuits involving hidden services.
>
The client and/or HS choose their guards as usual. All other relays in
both Intro Circuits and both Rendezvous Circuits in a HS access are
chosen with the bandwidth-weighted probabili
tential. But this was before we did the research that so
strongly motivated the need for guard nodes.) The ten minute choice
was an informed one, and we had some numbers on public-key overhead.
But we had no hard usage data or similar on which to base our
intuitions.
aloha,
Paul
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ust in a pseudonym or what you mean by "true name"
(some sort of Vinge reference?), but in any case that's the best
Freudian typo of the day.
aloha,
Paul
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On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 09:26:59PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
> On 10/15/2014 08:57 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 06:15:37PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
> >>
> >> "Web of Trust" is problematic for those who chose pseudonymity. Over the
> >>
27;, but no convenient-enough-to-be-useful term
is going to be the 100% best choice in all respects. 'Onion site'
sounds like a winner to me. (But who would have expected it, clearly a
dark horse, perhaps even a dark web horseman of the infocalypse...
Oh dear.)
aloha,
Paul
On Wed, Nov 12, 20
conceptual confusion
frequently made in the media and important to counter is that these
sites/services/whatever are part of the Tor network. Yes I know they
also confuse "The Web" with "The Internet" but its even more useful
for us to keep those separate. Calling them "onion
if
everything betweent eh entry and exit relasys is honest and well performing.
(See "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries"
http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf.
The last comment of the paragraph is correct however.
aloha,
Paul
-
On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:29:49PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
> On 12/14/2014 09:28 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 01:04:06PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
> > [snip]
> >>
> >> However, Tor is by design a Chaum-style network of untrusted nodes. As
> &g
ttps://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhyCalledTor
aloha,
Paul
(Note, the German meaning of 'Tor' mentioned in the FAQ is discussed in the
"A Peel of Onion" paper, the Turkish meaning is apparently a fine-meshed net.)
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T
ted destinations such as a bridge.
I have certainly not given all the reasons for using either
configuration, nor have I spelled out all the risks from every
possible adversary. But I hope this helps.
aloha,
Paul
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on both sides. To be successful at this
a low-latency cascade like JAP must maintain a constant (or adequately
large) anonymity set of the same persistent clients concurrently and
must use padding and other techniques to prevent natural or induced
patterns from giving away the corr
most certainly the phrase of the
week if not month---and (for me) before dawn on the first day at that.
aloha,
Paul
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On Mon, Feb 02, 2015 at 01:32:06PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
> On 02/02/2015 11:56 AM, spencer...@openmailbox.org wrote:
> > Paul Syverson paul.syverson at nrl.navy.mil:
> >> See p. 129 of http://www.acsac.org/2011/program/keynotes/syverson.pdf
> >> also
> >
/syverson.pdf
> >>>>also
> >>>>https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhyCalledTor
> >>>>
> >>>>aloha,
> >>>>Paul
> >>>>
> >>>>(Note, the German meaning of 'Tor' mentioned in the
On Mon, Feb 02, 2015 at 01:44:05PM -0800, Seth wrote:
> On Mon, 02 Feb 2015 13:37:58 -0800, Paul Syverson
> wrote:
>
> >The point was that there was a bunch of stuff we started doing at NRL
> >in 1995 we called "onion routing" including what we eventually called
; the cleanest and trustworthy thing, but you can still provide the CSR,
> meaning you own the key. And they support 4096b with sha2…
>
See also https://letsencrypt.org/
Let's Encrypt plans to offer free and automatic to set up certificates
from a recognized authority starting in mid-2015. (N
bandwidth costs could
> be reduced for both the Exit operator and CloudFlare (assuming that traffic
> within a datacenter or AS is counted separately).
>
This should have security advantages as well against end-to-end
correlation by an AS level adversary.
aloha,
Paul
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ere a problem.
HTH,
Paul
On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 07:32:05PM -0400, Max Bond wrote:
> Have you tried this over multiple circuits? Is it possible your DNS
> provider is the one doing something naughty?
>
> On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 7:12 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Apr 3,
ally vetted by the best scientific and technical researchers on
the planet from the most respected advanced institutions in every
country. What could they possibly add to the truly dizzying intellect
manifest in your arguments to date?
Apologies to others for failing to resist feeding the trol
ously is highly manual. So
"easily" is in the eye of the beholder. We discuss use cases,
protections, efficiencies, and conveniences provided. Also
complementarity to TLS, automation, and the potential for integration
with existing tools such as Convergence and Monkeysphere. Also,
integr
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 10:24:31PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
> On 05/19/2015 09:10 PM, Paul A. Crable wrote:
>
>
>
> > Is there some way to keep TOR out of the hands of sleazebags and crooks?
>
> No, there's not.
>
> Also, not everyone agrees who the "s
ed in the mentioned papers, but it has also been born out by
several later results as the network and its use have grown.
[0] Locating Hidden Servers. Overlier and Syverson
available at http://freehaven.net/anonbib/
[1] Low-Resource Routing Attacks Against Tor. Bauer et al.
ava
ford to have always-on, full-length padding to
connect to the network. Nor would they like the performance of the
limit to that rate (e.g. no bursts above it).
aloha,
Paul
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locked at the destination end for access from
specific network locations. As Seth noted, what has been added (and
continues to be developed) since the early 2000s version of Tor are
various methods to obfuscate that someone is connecting to the Tor network.
aloha,
Paul
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st
a significant portion of the threats facing them. This is far from
the whole story, but is important to keep in mind. For more, see
"A Peel of Onion", "Why I'm not an Entropist", "Anonymity Loves
Company: Usability and the Network Effect", and "Challen
Am 2013-08-09 12:23, schrieb Roman Mamedov:
> What is "www.torproject.us", and is it a scam clone website serving trojaned
> copies of Tor and TBB?
It is an official mirror page of torproject.org:
https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors.html.en (the fifth from the top)
ncern worth mentioning, or...
Malicious stuff happens, but most of the time these things are
incompetence or similar rather than malicious intent.
Until we know more, it's important to keep that in mind.
-Paul
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s a thread for this topic as well [2].
Paul
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-August/029638.html
[2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-August/029582.html
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rate researchers, and lots of others have done
trying to design for a diverse userbase. www.freehaven.net/anonbib/
is a fine place to start. If you can come up with better designs,
we would love to have them. Please share those rather than the
allegations you keep making but offer no support for, such as
"Tor isn't 'subverted' - it just flawed...by design."
aloha,
Paul
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also
at the ISPs, the ASes, the IXPs, etc. It is hard to say anything more
about such an adversary without more details. You might want to see
"Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor By Realistic
Adversaries" and some of the earlier work on this issue cited therein.
HTH,
Paul
.
On Fri, Aug 30, 2013 at 07:06:57PM -0300, Juan Garofalo wrote:
> At 11:33 AM 8/30/2013 -0400, Paul S. wrote:
>
> >> >> 1. Respect our efforts on this front. We're doing our best with
> >> >> what we have 2. Provide citations to support your c
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 10:59:55PM -0300, Juan Garofalo wrote:
>
> At 02:31 PM 9/11/2013 -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
>
> > Most people involved in creating Tor
> >including, e.g., Andrew Lewman, now Executive Director, of the Tor
> >Project Inc. first got invo
that people can easily do strong
and repeatable analysis not just of the design but of the deployment
and usage (cf. https://metrics.torproject.org/ ) You need to spend a
lot of time doing your own research
(cf. https://research.torproject.org/techreports.html) as well as
collaborating with others a
ing. Not entirely facetiously I told him that the fascinating
technological problems and the pontential to better protect people and
their activities was nice, but the real attraction was to create a
context where people who were sure they should hate each other were
forced to collaborate.
alo
;
> Yes, I see that. I must admit I mostly got a fair hearing from you.
>
>
>
> >Well no not exactly. I was being a bit terse with "set up for",
> > but I've already been overlong in so many respects. As Roger has already
> >explained somewh
the existing Tor network and usage in
order to properly incorporate trust into routing for improved future
design.
HTH,
Paul
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'd like to collaborate? Do you have a reading list?
I'm all for more research in this space, but why create a separate
database, especially if there are currently few paper? Couldn't you
contribute these to anonbib? Probably you want to create a new topic
label for them.
-Paul
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eputation"
You can find all of these on my homepage http://www.syverson.org/
aloha,
Paul
On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 11:53:45AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 9:44 AM, Sebastian G.
> wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > beside having each authority call in for
nths since we're now focused elsewhere---such as on how
specifically to improve things using trust in the face of the
User's-Get-Routed results.
aloha,
Paul
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ins on the ground where the light is
better, it doesn't mean that there are actually more coins on the
ground there rather than elsewhere.)
If you make claims without considering the above, you are just making
stuff up and fooling yourself that you have evidence for it.
aloha,
Paul
>
t a major event where there was extensive testing and
This was a major community/social event, the Winter Tor Developers Meeting,
_Not_ some major breach event or similar, just in case anyone was wondering.
-Paul
> bugfixes. But as a rule, more testing reveals bugs which leads to
> bu
log https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
-Paul
>
>
> 2014-03-07 10:32 GMT+00:00 Maimun Rizal :
>
> > Dear All,
> >
> > is there any attack can be break anonymity in TOR network? if so, how?
> >
> > I assume, if I want to break anonymity in
in order not-to-mix dirty traffic with
> very-reasonably-good-traffic, could be one of the path to work on.
Or encouraging corporations to run the same, e.g., allowing exit only
to their servers/ports and only for appropriate classes of
traffic. This is something we suggested early on, I think
s preferable to adding more clarification to the
frontpage. A _well designed_ user study might tell us more about how
different options are perceived. In the meantime we have competing
intuitions.
aloha,
Paul
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On Sun, Mar 09, 2014 at 10:21:52AM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> Il 3/8/14, 8:39 PM, Paul Syverson ha scritto:
> > If you naively view Tor as Yet Another Pulbic Proxy, I agree. But this
> > is the same thinking that leads you to block all encrypted traffic you
> >
ndle
cases when one relay could not directly reach another, although it
had other features.)
HTH,
Paul
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he frustration expressed.
>
> I would recommend finding a way to turn the negative into a positive.
> Embrace the negative with a joke, for instance:
>
> Use the Dark Web. "Go Over to the Dark Side."
They have cookies.
aloha,
Paul
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email exchanges that we actually started
using 'Tor' to refer to the basic onion routing system design that
we were working on before the design now generally called "Tor".
'Tor' also means a fine-meshed net in Turkish.
aloha,
Paul
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 10:49:01PM
ze systems to
protect people. I often take way longer than that to respond to
substantive well-reasoned questions, as do many people with jobs
and/or lives. Such people also typically expect response times
proportional to the importance, urgency, and reasonableness of the
questions. To such peo
On Tue, Jul 01, 2014 at 08:31:00PM +0100, Mark McCarron wrote:
> Paul,
>
[snip]
> Eliminating this correlation attack is trivial.
So you keep saying. Everybody who has worked on this who has responded
has said that they don't know how and that they find this a hard
problem. But
On Tue, Jul 01, 2014 at 04:41:30PM -0300, Juan wrote:
> On Tue, 1 Jul 2014 14:36:08 -0400
> Paul Syverson wrote:
>
[snip]
>
> >It's hard to imagine what would satisfy you at this point but
> > perhaps this will help: I designed Tor with Roger and Nick. At all
>
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