S password to
isolate web activity by urlbar domain/navigation session. The "Request
Origin" roughly translates to the referer domain.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3455
We'll probably also use "mozilla" or "TBB" as the SOCKS username, t
over who is viewing what at all times. At some
point, you simply run out of differentiating bits to extract from size
and timing information to properly segment the userbase.
And as far as I know, no one has really considered the full impact of
userbase size on correlation in the research community (asid
Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepe...@torproject.org):
> > But passive correlation is adequate anyway, even at very low sampling
> > rates (cf. Murdoch and Zielinski, PETS 2007). This is long known and
> > well understood. It's why we have always said that onion routing
>
maybe the NSA. The "Obfsproxy" button
would remove "Tor" from those points (due to protocol obfuscation).
3. I agree with the Raccoon that the NSA's data sharing link is most
accurately described as "Uncertain". Maybe the
rence implementations exist for all of these protocols?
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
your ISP from easily telling you're even using Tor. It is meant for
deployment in censored locations with a high degree of risk and/or
conflict. But I bet people concerned with privacy will be interested in
it too. It's a bit early for end users to just jump in and start using
it, though.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
on again. See also #3846 and consider signing up to test builds
in your hardened, auditing setups.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
oject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/build/BuildSignoff
You did the right thing. Adding yourself to Cc on
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3846 will keep you
appraised of the process as it materializes.
> Where does one get the info that a new version is about to be released?
> Where are pre-relea
* believe we can capture that userbase if we ship a
JS-disabled-by-default browser.
2. Exploitable vulnerabilities can be anywhere in the browser, not just
in the JS interpreter. We disable and/or click-to-play the known major
vectors, but the best solutions here are providing bug bounties (Mozill
Thus spake Maxim Kammerer (m...@dee.su):
> On Mon, May 14, 2012 at 12:26 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > I do *not* believe we can capture that userbase if we ship a
> > JS-disabled-by-default browser.
>
> First, I would like to say that I agree that Javascript and other
> pop
looked into THESE special types of cookies & if they
> potentially compromising anonymity or even increasing chances of
> fingerprinting, due to information they transmit about every site
> you visit?
>
___
> tor-talk mailing list
> tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torpr
;
>
>
> On Monday, May 14, 2012, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
>
> > On 5/14/2012 1:56 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >
> >> The short answer is "Yes, we've looked into it. New Identity removes
> >> evercookies."
> >>
> >> The long answer i
zen blog posts on the
topic, several tor-talk posts, and probably a few dozen mailinglist
threads, may of which you yourself participated in.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproj
Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepe...@torproject.org):
> Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
>
> > How, pray tell, does clicking New Identity remove evercookies from
> > 12 - 15 possible locations? The cache isn't the only place
> > evercookies can be stored. H
Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
> On 5/14/2012 1:56 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >The short answer is "Yes, we've looked into it. New Identity removes
> >evercookies."...
> >
> >The footnote is "Please help us test this shit in new release
rwise, you're condemning the user to get owned as their client
gradually gets more and more exploitable from the date they install
Torbirdy.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torpr
__
> tor-talk mailing list
> tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing
ect.org/projects/tor/ticket/5791
4. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5767
5. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5837
6. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3688
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
e everything via
direct email, especially to start.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
o myself to update the TBB design doc to describe
the update check.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5273#comment:2
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https:
nst
Facebook and other companies who are simply using the tracking
technology provided to them by browser makers; and weird filter addons
like Request Policy and Ghostery to try to filter "bad actors" (who can
simply reappear under new domains on a moment's notice anywa
Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepe...@torproject.org):
> Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
>
> > A few months ago, someone raised the question of TBB or any included
> > addon not blocking web beacons / trackers and perhaps something like
> > Ghostery should be
h are fairly straight forward, w/ a little
> explanation, even though users must go to Adobe's site to change
> them (tricky, huh?). Even I could write / "borrow" instructions on
> how to change settings in Windows Flash manager, for better privacy.
> Cookies & disk
it by myself at
the moment, so long as we're able to accept a significant lag time on
rather serious issues being fixed, and able to accept that almost
nothing other than violations of our privacy and security requirements
will *ever* get fixed.
Sadly, this will lead to a shitty user experience
Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
> On 5/19/2012 3:14 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >...Normal web browsers do not consider the ability to link your
> >accounts and activity across multiple url domains to be a problem.
> > As a result, we have all sorts of
rous to assume that Google's
position wrt Chrome will always remain what it is now.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
ng to the internet. Maybe it would have value once the
> browser is closed, Flash proxy bypass has already occurred. Unless
> you're talking about something else.
Yes, it would require a custom sandbox of our design. Current sandboxing
tech (Seatbealt, AppArmor, Seccomp, SELinux)
between us before we
can expect to come to an understanding.
Thus spake Joe Btfsplk (joebtfs...@gmx.com):
> On 5/19/2012 9:17 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >I'm confused. What vectors do you belief remain that we have not
> >covered a few dozen times in this thread and others? You
ac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5797#comment:12.
If the prefs don't cause a warning of some kind first, you might need to
adapt that component I linked to in comment 11...
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-tal
r guard =.
You get both this message and the above message for the same guard?
What ranges of values of M, m, and n have you seen?
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
htt
gal/Questionable"
category, and guess what, it's #42 at 0.15% of the traffic:
http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf
I don't know what you're looking for, but perhaps your own desire for
everyone to use Tor for "illegal and questionable" stuff is biasi
In particular, I work on Tor
Browser because every time I am forced to use a browser that does not
defend against third party tracking, I cringe.
> >No offense to the weirdos, though. You guys are my people :).
>
> Really? You don't come across as very friendly to the 'weir
Thus spake Maximum Camera (m...@dee.su):
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 10:01 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > The Tor users page is in my mind a reflection of what our demographics
> > will look like as we improve our technology enough to be useful for
> > everyone who wants Internet
ated
crawlers...
Still, it is a little surprising they can't trace bitcoin yet, though.
Maybe they can. I think my bet is also on Silk Road not surviving in the
long run for that reason... It's very interesting to watch, for sure.
It's like we're getting an extra season of Th
al. (Also, as you know from your path bias warn bug, it turns
out there's a damn lot of crazy codepaths in circuit construction. Who
knew? I didn't write the original code. I just tried to help modify it
to make it slightly safer).
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital sig
h, this is probably also likely. I wonder if they started
sporting the bling yet. Unless they're *also* cackling madly from their
space ship, wondering why the monkeys didn't learn the futility of this
whole game a century ago with alcohol...
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digit
Thus spake antispa...@sent.at (antispa...@sent.at):
> On Sat, Aug 11, 2012, at 00:14, Mike Perry wrote:
> > .onion is another thing that is tragically failing to reach its
> > potential because no one tries to make it useful for normal stuff. I
> > rather intensely dislik
e should be spending a couple
of bucks here and there to pay to keep exploits out of the hands of the
lunatics, and make sure the bugs actually get fixed, for *everyone*?
Also, you know what, fuck the drug war too. It's going to consume us all
like a cancer. That shit is so *over*.
P.S.
web.archive.org/web/20100416150300/http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Sep-2008/msg00016.html
might be the last full public copy other than your repost. I've added
the Raccoon on Cc so s/he can hopefully do a full repost if the seul
archives end up being destroyed forever.
--
Mike Perry
signa
Thus spake Maxim Kammerer (m...@dee.su):
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > The Raccoon has made a believer out of me, but there are some limits to
> > both of his/her proofs.. The full proofs can still be found here:
> > http://web.archive.org/we
some kind to
determine the optimal circuit isolation mechanism network-wide, but that
seems like a waste of time to me, since what I'm proposing doesn't
strike me as very resource-intensive in the common case. I'm open to
suggestions on how t
reason, I think a dynamic binary+$LD_LIBRARY_PATH+shared libs
is the best option for third party bundlers..
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
ob/master:/path-spec.txt
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
PP specs to
fact-check before composing this email:
http://xmpp.org/xmpp-protocols/rfcs/
I was unable to determine if torchat even has property 1 in that time...
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
f options to prevent such abuse,
but I am not opposed to stopgaps such as throttling loud clients and QoS
mechanisms to impact the popularity of resource-intensive filesharing
apps...
I suspect most of the other Tor folks in favor of "Tor and P2P" are in
the same boat.
--
Mike Perr
probably a lot of work to implement and get the
UI right, and so it's not high on the priorities list compared to other
things. It's also one of the few areas where I think partial solutions
will do us way more harm than good.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description:
Thus spake Julian Yon (jul...@yon.org.uk):
> On Tue, 6 Nov 2012 14:44:37 -0800
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > I am deeply opposed to shipping an always-on universal adblocker with
> > the default TBB. I think it would be political suicide in terms of
> > accomplishing o
ram-testing-plan-2012-03-16.pdf
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
EDGE?
If it is significantly slower than your wifi (especially in terms of
ping times/latency), this could be bug #3443:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3443
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk ma
44. I find this
annoying because I actually like having local TBB browsing history.
On the plus side, any custom Firefox extensions you have in your TBB do
stay active after updating this way (though the usual caveat about
choosing your extensions carefully to avoid leaks and
phisticated operations.
This would also be consistent with it just being a one-man operation run
by the IAmA poster on reddit.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
who framed our
> exit relay funding debate as an "if you" vs "now that" game. When you
> incentivize people with "if you X, I'll Y", they behave differently than
> when it's "now that you've X, I'll Y".
Does this theory hav
nto an
"Identity provider" for the Internet. Good luck with that, guys... I
for one love a good lolocaust ;).
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Oct 2012
> From: Mike Hearn
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] registration for youtube, gmail over Tor -
> fake voicemail / sms anyone?
Thanks for clarifying this for me. Sorry for the misunderstanding.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
their assumption holds equally well for these
CPUs, I would also guess that the interrupts even from passively
scanning WiFi should provide enough entropy even without driver support,
though. From the table in that that url, it looks like the least amo
actually have these things see real use.
[1]. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/pets08metrics.pdf, section 6.
[2]. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1854
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-
ol that automatically stores consensus history for later
out-of-band comparison against the public git repo, or even for live
multipath validation.
Might be a fun intro project for someone interested in getting involved
in Tor, actually, and it would potentially be a helpful validation tool
for
Thus spake unknown (unkn...@pgpru.com):
> On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 15:49:54 -0400
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > Longer term, I'm interested in having some form (or better: many forms)
> > of multipath consensus validation:
>
> May be that algo is relevant to inde
; care if those I know also left Tor, but if you guys do not take this
> matter seriously, Tor will become irrelevant.
Signed consensus documents that everyone can globally verify are the
best way we know of to "take this matter seriously".
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digi
the state
file got truncated?
If you can reproduce the issue reliably, can you perhaps send us the
results of something like 'grep "Build" /var/lib/tor/state'? Private
email is fine.
Don't ever publish the entire state file though: it is dangerous to your
hidden service
t.org/blog/new-firefox-17-and-tor-alpha-bundles
Be aware that it is an alpha, and more auditing work needs to be done
on Firefox 17 in general, though.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
ase let me know.
>
> I am trying to get some patches merged into the Linux TBB bundle start
> up script "start-tor-browser". I started with a trivial one:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7266
>
> Already mailed Mike Perry, but no response.
If you have
ning the Entry Node or it is being hosted on Google, the
> Google would still be able to correlate the Size and Time?
>
> ___ tor-talk mailing list
> tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-t
sn't strike me as the
right move.
We do have quite a bit more work to do before this stuff is actually
usable by most of the population, and I think that is what a 3.x version
number represents to most people (or at least it used to).
After all, we are attempting to do what is more or l
of their users is visiting, especially
over a number of days of repeated activity, and especially for smaller
identity providers (or malicious providers that set very low cert
expiration times for both user certs and their own IdP certs).
I guess I probably should bring these issues up
like we can certainly hammer it in there if we have to ;).
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
e long-lived by default.
As far as I can tell, also having the onion key doesn't get you much
beyond what the identity key enables, especially if you're an "external"
adversary (such as we would presume the NSA and other intelligence
agencies to be).
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
s shouldn't be too
hard to hack up with a well-documented controller library such as Stem:
https://stem.torproject.org/
I would be happy to help mentor someone to do this for GSoC, etc.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
etection
> and interception, but goes further than that, and makes traffic
> itself plausibly deniable, not just the content of or parties to a
> particular instance of communication.
>
> Tor needs to evolve very rapidly and become impossible to detect,
rocess.
Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net):
> On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in
> >long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might
> >solve them in your redesign with Mr Dis
Thus spake Seth David Schoen (sch...@eff.org):
> Alex M (Coyo) writes:
>
> > It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> > contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/
> https://www.torproject.org/torb
Thus spake grarpamp (grarp...@gmail.com):
> >>> It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> >>> contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> Mike does a good deal of fine work for the Tor project.
> And I'm happy to see the
t..
I believe we even have an upstream deliverable for a flash sandbox.. Not
my area of personal expertise or interest, though. I'm with Steve Jobs
on this one: kill that fucker until it is dead.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
y
serve to allow us to more effectively rate limit abuse.
1. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Persona
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
gt; >
> > ___
> > tor-talk mailing list
> > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
> >
> ___
> tor-talk mailing list
edia.org/wiki/Feature_selection
Ad-hoc techniques as simple as making a conscious effort to "sound" like
someone else have also been shown to be effective without requiring much
practice, but it can also be difficult to break certain key stylistic
habits.
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
ypothesis is right I ask owners of Exit-nodes, if it
> possible, to let that port in their ExitPolicies.
Not sure if that's actually the problem, but if the only way you can
get to Skype is to use a Bittorrent-supporting exit, it certainly seems
like a possibility.
Th
or-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build
Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
post them on the blog by Monday, unless something goes horribly wrong.
https://people.torproject.org/~mikeperry/tbb-3.0alpha1-builds/official/
--
Mike Perry
sig
and sign that tag?
> l11n:
> At least the German translation should see some improvements before you
> do a final release. I'll look into Transifex within the next days. The
> blog post announcing the alpha should call for help in that regard.
>
> Some dial
quot;2.3.25-9-Linux",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-MacOS",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-Windows",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-Linux"
> "3.0-alpha-1-Linux"
> "3.0-alpha-1-MacOS"
> "3.0-alpha-1-Windows"
> ]
>
> There missing commas at the end of
Matt Pagan:
> On 6/15/13, Georg Koppen wrote:
> > On 15.06.2013 09:15, Andreas Krey wrote:
> >> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +, Mike Perry wrote:
> >> ...
> >>> Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> >>> pos
le place so that we don't get into a
> situation where there's an updated version but TBL can't find it?
There will always be a chicken/egg problem here. We need to update the
recommended versions file before the bundles get uploaded so that the
first people who download them don&
Andreas Krey:
> On Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:09:28 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > For everyone who is experiencing these crashes: Do you have a system tor
> > installed? If so, if you uninstall it and reboot, does TBB still crash?
>
> Not sure what 'system tor' i
Matt Pagan:
> On 6/16/13, Andreas Krey wrote:
> > On Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:09:28 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> > ...
> >> For everyone who is experiencing these crashes: Do you have a system tor
> >> installed? If so, if you uninstall it and reboot, does TBB still cra
rspec.git. Fixes bug 8965.
>
> o Code simplification and refactoring:
> - Avoid using character buffers when constructing most directory
> objects: this approach was unwieldy and error-prone. Instead,
> build smartlists of strings, and concatenate the
ve the
infrastructure to set up and seed magnet links atm.
Should I just serve them out of people, and should Tor Browser Launcher
use my people homedir instead of www?
In the meantime, I've synced the mirrors to create this url, which
should be up shortly:
https://www.torproject.org/dist/to
:Andreas Krey
>
> Sent: Saturday, June 15, 2013 12:15 AM
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Tor Browser Bundle 3.0alpha1 test builds
>
>
> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> >
Andreas Krey:
> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> > post them on the blog by Monday, unless something goes horribly wrong.
> >
> > https://people.torproject.org/~
wnloading a new one to replace it, though..
--
Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Nick Mathewson:
> On Sat, Jun 29, 2013 at 10:32 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > David Balažic:
> >> Hi!
> >>
> >> You don't realize how big the TBB is until you're forced to use a slow
> >> connection.
> >>
> >> In that light, are
city.
> Would it be able to keep the nickname or would it have to change also?
> Would this have effect on the onion address if I had a hidden server?
No and no, but your hidden server might have brief downtimes/descriptor
publish times that correlate with your key rotation. Not
Andreas Krey:
> On Tue, 02 Jul 2013 12:33:10 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > But I got distracted by more pressing issues before I could finish the
> > scripts.. Also, many of those encrypted+authenticated Tor container
> > things probably don't make much
think protocol-level active attacks
(such as RPW's hidden service Guard discovery attack, and the Raccoon's
bitstomping/tagging attack) are far more likely to be how intelligence
agencies and others will attack Tor:
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf
https://lists.torproj
pers/PETS08_slides.pdf
There's quite a few other side channels available if you can get on
the same ethernet segment as a sniffer, or on the same VM host as a
suspicious tor node.
Most of these techniques are also fairly easy to evade, if you try.
--
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fsck
eplies?
>
> I am sorry if all this is already somewhere written. ;-)
>
> (And all this is still just in a planning stage, we will have to see
> if the budget will support it.)
>
>
> Mitar
> ___
> tor-talk mailing list
>
Thus spake Daniel Bryg (ferment...@gmail.com):
> ...earlier today. Not sure who's maintaining it, so posting this here.
Thanks, this has been taken care of. Sorry for the delay.
--
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs
pgpfNqHb0DeKK.pgp
Description: PGP s
to only break "just some kind" of
malicious traffic is bound to fail (and in rather hilarious ways).
Skynet just isn't that good yet. Maybe some day the machines will
protect us from ourselves, but that day is not today.
--
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs
p
can gather information on the extent of
targeted, CA-authenticated MITM events. They want to find a silver
bullet against the CA model, to conclusively prove that it can't
possibly provide the security properties it claims. The Perspectives
protocol is not set up to do this.
--
Mike Perry
Mad Com
1 - 100 of 239 matches
Mail list logo
